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1 INTRODUCTION: THE EU-ACP RELATIONS AND THE 
COTONOU AGREEMENT  
 
The European Union’s development policy is the subject for this thesis. More 
precisely it deals with the EU’s development policy toward the Third World, mainly 
African countries, but also Pacific and Caribbean countries, the so-called ACP group. 
These countries are all former colonies of some of EU’s Member States, especially 
France and Great Britain, as we will see. EU’s policy toward these countries goes back 
to the late 1950’s (more on that below). But in this thesis I have chosen to focus on the 
Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and the ACP states, more precisely 
the process which led to this agreement.  
 The Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States of the one part and the European Community and its 
Member States of the other part, often referred to as the Cotonou Agreement1, was 
signed on June 23 2000 (Brown, 2002: 191). The Cotonou Agreement replaced the 
Lomé Convention (see below). As a headline of an article in ACP-EU Courier states, 
the signing of this new agreement marks “a new era of cooperation” (Karl, 2000a). In 
an interview with Kenneth Karl in ACP-EU Courier, Bernard Petit, director in 
European Commission declares that the Cotonou Agreement is something unique:  
 
“The Cotonou Agreement is the only one of its kind in the world. I know of no other 
agreement which is as global as this and which is based on the three pillars of politics, trade 
and development between a group of industrialised countries and a group of developing 
countries. The conclusion of this Agreement shows that the will within the EU to set up a 
framework of privileged relations with the ACP group is indeed genuine.” (Karl, 2000b) 
The main objective of the Cotonou Agreement is to reduce and then eradicate poverty 
(the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 1)2. According to the agreement the partners are 
equal (ibid: Art. 2). The ACP States are supposed to define the development strategies 
                                            
1 When referring to this agreement in this thesis, I will not use its full name, but refer to it as the “Cotonou 
Agreement.” See one example above. 
2 I have chosen to refer to the articles in the Cotonou Agreement. 
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for their economies themselves; these states own the development strategies (ibid: Art. 
2). Participation, dialogue and mutual obligations are fundamental principles, in 
addition to regionalisation (ibid: Art. 2). Peace-building and conflict prevention are 
other important features (ibid: Art. 11). Other important objectives are sustainable 
development and integration of the ACP countries into the world economy (ibid: Art. 
19). I will present the content of the Cotonou Agreement in more detail in chapter 
four. 
 
1.1 The EU’s Development Policy 
The European Union is a very important actor in the development process today and 
about half of all public aid to the developing countries comes from the EU (The 
European Community’s Development Policy- Statement by the Council and the 
Commission, http://www.europa.eu.int). And the EU is a very important trading 
partner for the developing countries (ibid). The EU is involved in all regions of the 
world (The European Community’s Development policy- Statement by the Council 
and the Commission, http://www.europa.eu.int). The most important principle in EU’s 
development policy is the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human 
and social development (ibid). The EU works to promote human rights, democracy, 
the rule of law and good governance (ibid). The most important objective is reducing 
and later, eradicating poverty (ibid). Other central elements of the development policy 
are the work to reduce inequality; supporting sustainable economic and social and 
environmental development and promoting the integration of the developing countries 
into the world economy (ibid).  
 The EU’s development policy towards the Third World has long roots: The 
Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, creating the European Economic Community, and 
contained articles about the colonies, or the Associates (Grilli, 1993: 7-9). Some of the 
Member States were colonial powers, especially France (ibid: 1). In the late 1950’s 
and the beginning of the 1960’s the process of decolonization started (ibid: 14). In 
1963 the first formal treaty between the EC and the newly decolonized countries in 
Africa was signed and it was named the Yaoundé I Convention (ibid: 9). Yaoundé II 
was signed in 1969 (ibid: 9). 
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 In 1973 the United Kingdom, a former colonial power, joined the European 
Community (Brown, 2002: 44). Two years later the Lomé Convention between the EC 
and the ACP States was signed in Lomé, Togo (ibid: 58). The Lomé Convention was 
renegotiated approximately every five or six years, in 1979, 1984, 1989 and 1995, 
introducing new trends like structural adjustment and political conditionality (Brown, 
2002: 64, 69, 88 and 129). In 1996 the European Commission issued a Green Paper on 
relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st 
century. Challenges and options for a new partnership (European Commission, 1996). 
It started a debate about the EU-ACP relations (European Commission, 1997: 6). The 
European Commission argues in the Green Paper that the world since the end of the 
Cold War has changed: Important factors are economic globalisation and 
interdependence, the technological innovation that spreads quickly, a demographic 
development characterised by strong population growth in sub-Saharan Africa and an 
expected decline in the global population growth and the development of a multipolar 
world (European Commission, 1996: 1-2). All these factors affect EU-ACP relations, 
according to the European Commission (European Commission, 1996: 1). The Green 
Paper also discusses different forms of cooperation (ibid: 44-45) and trading 
arrangements between the EU and the ACP group (ibid: 65-67). I will go into detail 
about the Green Paper in chapter 4. Negotiations about a new partnership agreement 
between the EU and the ACP Group began in September 1998 and the Partnership 
Agreement was signed in Benin’s capital Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Brown, 2002: 
191). The agreement is often referred to as the Cotonou Agreement. Above I 
mentioned some of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. A new invention of this 
agreement is the regional economic partnership agreements which are being 
negotiated, which are supposed to enter into force by January 1 2008 (the Cotonou 
Agreement, 2000: Art. 37). This was only a short overview over EU-ACP relations. I 
will go into details in a later chapter. 
 
1.2 Research question 
There are several aspects of this subject that can be studied and analysed in a thesis. 
This thesis will not focus much on the contents of the Cotonou Agreement, except for 
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chapter 4. The subject of this thesis is the process which led to the signing of the 
Cotonou Agreement. I will focus particularly on the EU’s interests as well as asking 
whether there were any other alternatives to continued cooperation with the ACP 
countries. The background for such a focus is the process of reviewing these relations, 
which the EU started in the 1990s, in which the Green Paper is considered important. 
 The research question for this thesis is: What were the driving forces for the EU 
in the process which led to the Cotonou Agreement? The term driving forces can have 
a rather wide definition. But here I have chosen to focus on two aspects of it; interests 
and path dependence. Two questions are central in this thesis:  
 
1. Which interests were decisive for the EU in the process which led to the 
Cotonou Agreement? 
2. Did the EU have any choice but to continue the relations with the ACP 
countries? 
 
 Although the process of reviewing the development policy began in the early 
1990s, I will focus on the period from 1996, the year the Green Paper was issued, until 
2000, the year when the Cotonou Agreement was signed. Although the European 
Union consists of national states that protect their own national interests, the EU will 
be treated as one international actor with its own interests in this thesis.  
 Choosing such a subject and research question could be explained by pointing 
to the fact that the EU has developed into a global actor, being involved in all parts of 
the world (see above). As I have mentioned above, the EU is an important donor and 
trading partner for the developing countries. Development policy is a significant part 
of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Another reason for the choice of 
subject is the long tradition of relations between the EU and the ACP countries. These 
relations have now been further developed and altered, due to various events and 
developments internationally, such as the end of the Cold War. The Cotonou 
Agreement is also quite interesting in itself, mainly because it to a large extent 
represents something new and it is a very ambitious agreement, with not only 
ambitious objectives, but it launches cooperation on several different issues. The 
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agreement also has an invention, the Economic Partnership Agreements, which are 
being negotiated (see chapter 4).  
 There is also a belief here that the interests of the EU may have changed since 
the Lomé Convention. The international changes since the end of the Cold War may 
explain that. Not only economic issues, such as trade, and values, such as democracy 
are important. The concept of security has changed in recent years, and security issues 
have become more important in recent years and seem to have affected these relations 
and the contents of the agreement. And the EU might have found it difficult not to go 
on cooperating with the ACP states, for various reasons. In other words, several factors 
might have affected the EU’s decision. 
  
1.3 Theory  
In order to give a proper analysis and answers to the research question, it is necessary 
with theoretical perspectives as analytical tools or framework. In this case, in which I 
am asking about driving forces, which can have a rather wide definition; it is useful 
having more than one theoretical perspective. In order to study various aspects of this 
subject, using two theoretical perspectives is necessary. I have chosen to use two quite 
different theoretical perspectives as analytical tools in this thesis.  
 
1.3.1 Realism / Neo-realism and interests 
The first theoretical perspective is realism and neo-realism. Realist thinking has long 
roots in political science, back to Antiquity, with Thucydides as an important source 
(Donnelly, 2000: 23). Other famous realists are Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and 
Hans Morgenthau (ibid: 13). It is characterised not as a theory, but rather as an 
approach to international relations (ibid: 6). Realism pays much attention to human 
nature and its constraints on politics (ibid: 9). There is also a focus on the lack of an 
international government (ibid: 9). Realism is a state-centric perspective, which means 
that states are the dominant actors in the international system (ibid: 7; 8). States are 
motivated by national interest and survival (ibid: 7). Structural realism, or neo-realism 
emphasises international anarchy (ibid: 11). The leading neo-realist is Kenneth Waltz 
(ibid: 30). As realism, neo-realism focuses on national interests (Matlary, 2002: 6). But 
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in addition to security interests the neo-realists emphasise the economic interests of 
states (ibid: 15). Security interests and economic interests are factors that explain 
international relations (ibid: 15). 
There is one particular aspect of this perspective that is interesting in this 
context; interests, which is a term usually associated with states. In chapter 2 I will 
present a definition of the term “interest” and a historical outline of the development of 
this concept. One type of interest is the “national interest”, which national states 
promote, or protect in their foreign policy (Matlary, 2002: 6). National interests 
comprise territorial security and economic security (Matlary, 2002: 6). In this thesis, in 
which the actor is not a national state, the term self-interest will be used instead of 
national interest. This is the traditional definition of interests.  
However, this definition has been challenged. The result has been a new 
definition of the term “interests.” According to Matlary (Matlary, 2004: 146) there are 
three types of interests: Security, economic and the “new” type, value-based interests. 
Value-based interests are often about promoting certain norms and values, such as 
human rights (Matlary, 2002: 6). Value-based interests have become more important 
after the end of the Cold War (ibid: 7). It is on the agenda in international relations and 
issues like peace, democracy and human rights are more important issues today than 
previously (ibid: 9). Joseph S. Nye Jr. is another political scientists who has defined 
interests. He has classified interests into three groups; A, B and C interests: The A 
interests are about security and a state’s survival; the B interests are about economy 
and the C interests are common interests, or interests shared by all countries, such as 
environment (Matlary, 2002: 18; Nye, 1999: 26). This perspective will be used to find 
out which interests that have been most important to the EU in the process which led 
to the Cotonou Agreement, with a particular focus on economic, security and value-
based interests in the analysis. 
  
1.3.2 Path dependence 
The second theoretical perspective that will be used in this thesis has a different focus. 
This perspective is called path dependence. This perspective is used to describe 
political processes (Pierson, 2000: 251). The presentation and discussion of path 
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dependence will to a large extent be based on an article by Paul Pierson. Path 
dependence is defined as a “social process grounded in a dynamic of “increasing 
returns”” (Pierson, 2000: 251). It claims that when you have chosen a course of action, 
or a certain policy it will most likely be very hard to reverse it (ibid: 251). However, in 
chapter 2 there will be two other definitions of path dependence, as well as some 
critique. 
 Increasing returns is an example of path dependence (Pierson, 2000: 251). With 
each step along a path the more likely it is that the actor will continue down that path 
(ibid: 252). Increasing returns processes are unpredictable, inflexible and might be 
path inefficient, in addition to being characterised by nonergodicity (ibid: 253). 
Politics is conducive to increasing returns processes due to these four aspects of 
politics: 1) the importance of collective action in politics; 2) a high number of 
institutions in politics; 3) political authority can be used to increase power 
asymmetries and 4) politics is characterised by “complexity and opacity” (Pierson, 
2000: 257). 
 Politics is characterised by “multiple equilibria, contingency, a critical role for 
timing and sequencing and inertia,” in cases marked by path dependence (Pierson, 
2000: 263). This perspective will be used in order to find out if there were any other 
alternative than going on with the relations with the ACP countries. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The next step now is to present the methodology of this thesis. There are several 
possible ways of designing a thesis, such as a case study, experiments, survey, archival 
analysis and history (Yin, 1994: 6). This thesis is designed as a case study. There are 
several types of case studies, such as atheoretical case studies, interpretive case 
studies, hypothesis-generating case studies, theory-confirming case studies, theory-
infirming case studies and deviant case studies (Collier, 1993: 107; Lijphart, 1971). A 
definition of what a case study is will be given in chapter 3. 
 This is an interpretive case study in which theoretical perspectives are the 
analytical framework. This case study has only one case. In other words, it is a single 
case study. It is also common to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative 
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methods, and between qualitative and quantitative data (Grønmo, 1996: 73-74). This is 
a qualitative analysis, in which I use qualitative data. I have performed one type of 
document analysis, qualitative content analysis. There are several sources of evidence, 
such as documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-
observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 1994: 79).  However, documents are the most 
important sources in this thesis, and document analysis is therefore the method used 
here. I have particularly focussed on using quotations from various sources in the 
analysis. Two terms need to be commented upon in discussing methodology. These 
terms are validity and reliability. The first one, validity refers to the relevance of the 
data for the research question in the thesis (Hellevik, 1999: 183). The second term, 
reliability refers to how things are measured (ibid: 183). I will have a closer discussion 
on these issues in the chapter about methodology. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has six chapters in addition to this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 presents 
and discusses the two theoretical perspectives that will be used in the analysis. I will 
present and discuss realism and the neo-realistic perspective, before I present and 
discuss three different types of interests. Finally, there will be a presentation and 
discussion of the second perspective, path dependence. The third chapter is about 
methodology. As this thesis is a case study; I will define and introduce case studies, 
especially the relevant type of case study. Further, I will have a presentation of use of 
evidence and a discussion on validity and reliability. In chapter four I will present the 
history of the relations between the European Union and the ACP countries, from the 
beginning in late 1950s with associationism, then the two Yaoundé Conventions, the 
first Lomé Convention, the renegotiations, the Green Paper and the Cotonou 
Agreement itself, including the Economic Partnership Agreements. I will particularly 
focus on the changes that have been made during the years.  
 Due to the use of two different theoretical perspectives the analysis is divided 
into two parts. Chapter five provides the first part of the analysis, discussing different 
types of interests and the importance of these to the EU. Chapter six is the second part 
of the analysis, discussing a second aspect of the research question, of whether there 
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was any other alternative than going on with the relations, using path dependence as 
framework. The second analytical chapter ends with a short discussion on whether the 
relations between the EU and the ACP States are an example of a process of increasing 
returns. Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusion, answering the research 
question and the questions asked in the two analytical chapters. There will also be a 
short discussion on whether the theoretical tools have been sufficient. Could any other 
perspectives or theories have been useful in this context? The last part of the 
conclusion is a look at the EU-ACP relations in the past, present and in the future. In 
addition to these chapters, there will be one appendix, with a list of the six groups 
negotiating economic partnership agreements with the EU.  
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2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: REALISM/ NEO-
REALISM, INTERESTS AND PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the theory and theoretical terms which will be the analytical 
framework in the analysis. The first theoretical perspective here is two theoretical 
groupings within international relations; realism and neo-realism. I will not deal with 
all aspects of realism and neo-realism, but rather give a short introduction. There is 
one aspect of realism/neo-realism that will be dealt with in particular and that is the 
term “interest.” I will present and discuss the traditional definition and history of the 
term interest, or national interest and then present and discuss newer definitions of 
interest, such as A, B and C interests and value-based interests. Later in this chapter I 
will present a very different theoretical perspective, namely path dependence, which 
has been used in economics and in recent years in political science (Pierson, 2000: 
251). Finally, I will explain how to use the theoretical terms in the analysis. 
 
2.2 Realism and Neo-realism 
Realism has long traditions in political science. It goes back to Thucydides in the 
Antiquity (Donnelly, 2000: 23). Other significant realists are Machiavelli, Thomas 
Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau (ibid: 13). Realism is not considered a theory, but rather 
an approach to or perspective on international relations (ibid: 6). There are several 
groupings of realism, like classical realism, which also is called biological realism and 
structural realism, or neo-realism (ibid: 11). Realism is characterised by its focus on 
human nature and its constraints on politics (ibid: 9). Human nature is marked by 
egoism and evil (ibid: 9-10). Realists also emphasise that there is no international 
government (ibid: 9), or in other words the international system is described as an 
anarchy (ibid: 10). States are the dominant actors in the international system (ibid: 7). 
They are considered rational actors, with a certain military capability which enables 
them to destroy other states (ibid: 7). National interests are the states’ basic motivation 
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(ibid: 7). Realists are sceptical towards international laws, institutions and ideals that 
may threaten nationalism (ibid: 8). 
 In the 1980s there was a new generation of realists, the so-called neo-realists 
(ibid: 30). Kenneth Waltz is often mentioned as the leading neo-realist, or as a 
representative of strong structural realism, with his book from 1979, Theory of 
International Politics (ibid: 16). Another leading neo-realist is Robert Gilpin, who has 
paid much attention to economic aspects of neo-realism (Matlary, 2002: 15). Structural 
realists or neo-realists put a strong focus on international anarchy (Donnelly, 2000: 
11). According to neo-realists states are unitary rational actors concerned with 
improving their material welfare (ibid: 30). States are, as in realism considered the 
most important actors (Matlary, 2002: 15). As in realism, neo-realism argues that 
foreign policy is all about promoting national interests, which mainly means security 
(ibid: 6). But neo-realists also underline the importance of economic interests (ibid: 6). 
Security interests and economic interests are factors that explain international relations 
(ibid: 15). 
 Using realism in this case can be problematic. In my thesis the actor is not a 
single state, but the European Union, a regional organisation. There is little or nothing 
about that kind of actors in neo-realism. Today there are other actors than states 
participating in the international system, for example non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and there are more international and regional organisations, such as the EU 
today, than ever before, as we will see below.3 To a larger extent than before the EU 
acts more like one actor in the international system, as one bloc. One example is in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (The EU and the WTO, http://europa.eu.int). 
Another aspect is the question of what kind of actor the EU is. Is the EU an 
intergovernmental organisation, with national states negotiating and fighting for their 
own interests? Or is the EU a federalist superstate? Does that mean a theoretical 
perspective like neo-realism cannot be used in this context? Not necessarily. A central 
concept of neo-realism is “interest”, which will be defined and discussed below. The 
EU has its own interests and own ambitions. The EU has become an international 
                                            
3 See 2.3.1 Value-based interests. 
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actor, and increasingly a global actor, which is involved in all parts of the world, not 
only the ACP states. 
 Neo-realism is just the starting point for this analysis. The term “interest” will 
be central in this chapter and in the analysis. National interests, or self-interests, are 
particularly important. However, in recent years, interest has been given new 
definitions and content. But first, I will look at the development of the term national 
interest. 
 
2.2.1 Interests, national interests or self-interests 
What does the term “interest” mean? Its origin is Latin and it means: “It concerns, it 
makes a difference to, or is important with reference to, some person or thing” (Beard, 
1934: 22). In realism, or neo-realism interests are usually linked to nations, or states, 
as we have seen above. The term “national interest” is a rather modern concept in 
diplomacy and it is a very common term (Beard, 1934: 4). Its origin is neither the 
Antiquity nor the Middle Ages: In Antiquity states and empires certainly pursued their 
interests, but it was not national interests and the Romans, for instance, found 
justification in “utilitas rei publica” or in “reipublicæ ratio et utilitas” (Beard, 1934: 4). 
After the collapse of the Roman Empire there were no national states (ibid: 5). But in 
the Middle Ages gradually small states were established, which were feudal 
principalities ruled by war lords, so there was still no national interest (ibid: 5). 
Eventually, these states developed into duchies, principalities and kingdoms (ibid: 5). 
Still there were no national interests; feudal principalities were merged into rising 
states and dynastic interest was the new concept (ibid: 8). By dynastic interest we 
mean expansion of territory, increase in personal property, “fortunate family alliances” 
and rivalries between individuals and between families (Beard, 1934: 8-9). Later it 
meant that the royal revenues were enlarged through “the enrichment of merchants and 
agriculturists” (Beard, 1934: 9). By the end of the 19th century the term dynastic 
interests were no longer used by diplomats (ibid: 9-10). A term which is related to 
dynastic interests is reason of the state, raison d’etat, or staatsrason; the roots of this 
term go back to Machiavelli (ibid: 14). Originally, it meant maintaining the present 
government in power, eliminating opposition at home, expanding territory and 
  13 
influence abroad and “enriching the ruling class of the state” (Beard, 1934: 14). This 
could be done for instance by bribing, making intrigues, by making war or forming 
secret alliances (ibid: 14). One reason of the state was “the honour of the prince”, 
which later was changed into “national honour” (ibid: 16). Today, however, terms like 
dynastic interest, state reason, the honour of the prince and national honour are 
abandoned (ibid: 21).  
 National interest as a concept was established when the national state system 
developed and influence of popular political control increased; at the same time 
economic relations expanded (ibid: 21). According to Beard (Beard, 1934: 22), 
diplomacy began using the term national interest when the national commercial state 
emerged and during increasing republican control over national affairs. Further, Beard 
(Beard, 1934: 23) argues that national interest is a result of a compromise between 
dynastic interests and interests of the rising class power, and then by popular power. In 
England terms like “England’s interest”, “public interest” and “national interest” 
became common by the end of the 17th century and were frequently used by 
parliamentarians, publicists and by members of the ruling classes (Beard, 1934: 24). 
 Promotion of national interests has traditionally been the core of foreign policy: 
National interests are linked to territorial security and economic security; a state is 
supposed to protect its national interests (Matlary, 2002: 6). This is “realpolitik”, 
which is defined as traditional and territorially defined national interests, which are 
security policy and economic interests (Matlary, 2002: 10). Security interests means 
defence against invasion (ibid: 6), and one state did not interfere in other states’ wars if 
it did not threaten its own territory (ibid: 10). Altruism and action motivated by values 
should not be a part of international relations, according to realists (ibid: 10). Today, 
security does not only have a national basis, but it has a broader definition: It 
comprises regional and global security (ibid: 6).  
 Today it is common to talk about a concept of extended security and the so-
called Copenhagen School, which has a wider definition of security than realism, with 
its focus on the state (Sjursen, 2004: 61). According to this school security is studied 
as a discourse in which some issues are “securitised,” which means that they become 
security issues, while other issues are “desecuritised,” which means they are no longer 
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security issues (ibid: 61). This school operates with five sectors in the study of 
security: The military sector, the environmental sector, the economic sector, the 
societal sector and the political sector, which all may be securitised (Sjursen, 2004: 
61). There have been some changes in European thinking about security: There is no 
longer a focus just on military threat; there are other threats as well: Social and 
economic inequalities, terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic 
conflict, international crime and migration (ibid: 65). Another new trend is the way of 
handling security threats: Instead of the traditional military alliances and search for 
balances of military force, there is a development towards institutionalisation and 
legally-binding agreements (ibid: 66). Multilateral institutions have become much 
more important in increasing European security (ibid: 66). 
 Economic interests are most often based on natural resources or business and 
promoting its own industry; today, however, economic interests are no longer national 
only, due to globalisation (Matlary, 2002: 16). 
 There are other definitions of the term national interests: Joseph Nye, Jr. (Nye, 
1999: 23) defines national interest (in democracies) as the priorities a state has in its 
relations with the rest of the world. It includes not only strategic interests, but also 
values like human rights and democracy (ibid: 23). National interests have also been 
defined as the preferences of decision-makers (Kratochwil, 1982: 5).  
 In this case, in which the EU is the main actor, national interest would not be 
the correct term. Self-interest (Donnelly, 2000: 9) is a more appropriate term. The EU 
is not a state or a nation, but can be considered as one actor in the international system, 
with its own interests. Both security and economy are important aspects here. These 
issues will be discussed below.  
 In this thesis the main focus is on the EU as an actor and the interests of the EU. 
I will focus exclusively on the EU’s interests in this thesis. 
  
2.2.2 EU’s interests 
So what interests does the EU have? The EU certainly has economic interests: The EU 
acts as one bloc within the World Trade Organisation, as well as in other trade issues, 
and the EU has a common trade policy (The EU and the WTO, http://europa.eu.int). 
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And it is the DG Trade that defines the trade interests of the European Community 
(DG TRADE MISSION STATEMENT, http://europa.eu.int). Trade with developing 
countries is certainly an important aspect here, and both the Lomé Convention and the 
Cotonou Agreement are good examples of that.4  The EU imports raw materials such 
as copper and aluminium (Brown, 2002: 51). Trade and trade-related areas, such as 
competition policy and trade and environment are also important parts of the Cotonou 
Agreement (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 34-52). The EU may look upon the 
ACP states as potential markets for their own products. In this way, having close 
economic ties with the Third World is an expression of economic interest. Another 
aspect of EU’s economic interests is their global ambitions. In 2000 Heads of State 
and Governments launched the so-called Lisbon Strategy, which is a series of reforms 
which shall make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world” (A new start for the Lisbon Strategy, http://europa.eu.int).  
 Another aspect of self-interest is the fight for power or influence. According to 
realism, states, and other actors as well, compete against each other for power and 
influence (Donnelly, 2000: 7, 11). Probably the EU is competing with, for example, 
the United States in gaining influence within the international system, or the EU tries 
to balance the United States. Is there a competition between the EU and the United 
States in gaining influence in the world after the Cold War? Does the EU try to 
become a different kind of actor in the international system than the United States, for 
instance? Is the EU a civilian power as someone has argued? (Sjursen, 2004: 68) Iraq 
can be used as an illustration here: The EU agreed that disarmament of Iraq was 
necessary, but they wanted a peaceful solution which should be done in accordance 
with United Nations Security Council resolutions (Conclusions of the European 
Council, 17 February, 2003, http://europa.eu.int). To the EU the use of force was only 
acceptable as “a last resort.” (Conclusions of the European Council, 17 February, 
2003, http://europa.eu.int) 
  An important question is: What kind of influence does the EU want in 
developing countries? Conflicts and wars are also an aspect of security. Conflict 
                                            
4 See chapter 4. 
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prevention and resolution are given a great deal of attention in the Cotonou Agreement 
(Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 11). 
 
2.3 New types and definitions of interests 
According to realists only material interests, which means security and economic 
interests, exist. However, in recent years the term interest has been given a new 
meaning; interests are not only material. Some has even questioned the concept of 
“national interest” (Nye, 1999: 22). Nye (Nye, 1999: 22) also asks whether interests 
can be defined in a conventional way in this information age. States are not to the 
same extent as before like the traditional realist model of billiard balls, due to the 
deregulated world, in which global markets and non-governmental actors play a 
greater role (ibid: 25). This makes it more difficult for political leaders to define 
priorities in foreign policy and define a state’s national interest (ibid: 25). According to 
Kratochwil (Kratochwil, 1982: 2) some believe the concept of national interest is a 
“myth” or it is a term without meaning. And the national interest can be seen as 
analytically unclear, but at the same time important, as decision makers use it (ibid: 2). 
 Interests have been classified into three groups, A, B and C: The A interests are 
linked to security and threats against a nation’s survival; the B interests are linked to 
threats to economic issues, but they do not threaten a nation’s survival and the C 
interests are common to all countries; it could be environmental problems, poverty or 
armed conflicts (Matlary, 2002: 18; Nye, 1999: 26). In recent years the C interests has 
dominated, and will continue to dominate the foreign policy agenda Nye, 1999: 29). 
The end of the Cold War is probably the main reason, as the threats from that period 
have disappeared; another explanation could be the fact that C list issues are given 
much more attention today than earlier (Nye, 1999: 29). Especially humanitarian 
issues dominate, due to the information age (ibid: 33). 
 
2.3.1 Value-based interests 
According to Matlary (Matlary, 2002: 4) the foreign policy agenda has and is still 
changing. Today there are more common interests than before (ibid: 4). Matlary 
(Matlary, 2004: 146) has suggested there are three types of interests: security, 
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economic and value-based. Further, she argues that norms, like human rights can be 
more important today (ibid: 146). And other actors than states, such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) participate in foreign policy making today (ibid: 
146). She argues being rational can be defined as a political strategy to achieve a 
particular goal, which can be human rights, for instance (ibid: 146). Value-based 
interests are often linked to certain norms or values, like human rights, which an actor 
wants to promote Matlary, 2002: 6). The actor has a goal, which is a norm or a value 
and it is pursued in a strategic way and the actor has a plan on how to achieve that goal 
(Matlary, 2002: 6-7). Especially after the Cold War value-based interests have become 
important; foreign policy today includes value-based diplomacy (ibid: 7). Values have 
become more important in international relations, with much more focus on peace, 
democracy and human rights today than only a few years ago (ibid: 9). Value-based 
diplomacy comprises peace mediation, peacekeeping operations, aid and establishing 
democracy and human rights work, both bilaterally and multilaterally (ibid: 9). 
 What can explain the increasing importance of value-based diplomacy? As 
mentioned above, humanitarian issues receive more attention today than before. The 
role of the mass media is significant here. Matlary (Matlary, 2002) presents these 
reasons for the increasing importance of value-based diplomacy: There has been a 
growth in multilateral diplomacy, mainly through an increased number of international 
organisations (IOs), international agreements/conventions and regimes and 
international courts and tribunals (ibid: 21). New actors have emerged, like non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which have become more important as actors in 
international relations due to globalisation of the press and communication (ibid: 22-
23). These new actors are both relevant and legitimate in the value-based diplomacy 
(ibid: 22). The role of the press is also important, as they tend to focus more on 
violations of human rights than national interests (ibid: 23). 
 There is a larger focus on values in international relations (Matlary, 2002: 29). 
In the post-war period international human rights have become better defined (ibid: 
29-30). In recent years foreign policy has been justified in values (ibid: 30). Political 
rhetoric internationally is to a larger extent based on values such as human rights, 
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democracy and the rule of law (ibid: 30). Matlary (Matlary, 2002: 30) presents the 
hypothesis that value-based foreign policy is getting more important. 
 This new concept of interest is quite interesting as it provides us with another 
analytical tool and extends the analysis. However, there could have been more focus 
on why actors promote values, such as human rights and democracy. Do actors want 
other actors to become more like them? What are the motives for promoting such 
values? How important are self-interests here, or how much egoism is involved? Do 
value-based interests really contradict self-interests?  
 
2.3.2 Value-based interests in the EU 
Does the EU have other interests than economic and security interests? The EU has 
established itself as an actor that promotes human rights and democracy (Sedelmaier, 
2004: 128). There are a few examples of events or situations in which this role as 
promoter of human rights and democracy has become quite obvious. I will mention 
some of them here. The eastern enlargement is one example (ibid: 128). A second 
example is the statement made by the Berlin European Council during the Kosovo 
crisis; in this statement the EU makes it clear that it does not tolerate violations of 
human rights (Bulletin of the EU 3-1999: 1.40; Sedelmaier, 2004: 134). Further, the 
EU declares that it is “responsible for securing peace and cooperation in the region. 
This is the way to guarantee our fundamental European values, i.e. respect for human 
rights and the rights of minorities, international law, democratic institutions and the 
inviolability of borders.” (Bulletin of the EU 3-1999: 1.40; Sedelmaier, 2004: 134, 
emphasis added by Sedelmaier) The Cotonou Agreement, which is the subject of this 
thesis, is a third example. It declares that the partnership between the EU and ACP 
shall contribute to the promotion of human rights, democratisation processes, 
consolidation of the rule of law and good governance (Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 
9). Could we say that the EU wants the rest of the world to become more like Europe 
in values, such as democracy and human rights? Is it an exportation of certain values? 
The EU declares in the Green Paper that it has an interest in promoting values such as 
peace, solidarity and respect for democracy and civil and political rights (European 
Commission, 1996: 38).  
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 An aspect of is this issue is what kind of actor the EU is. Some has tried to 
define the EU as something different from a state. Some look upon “Europe as an 
ethical and responsible power” (Sjursen, 2004: 68). Sjursen (Sjursen, 2004, 68) refers 
to Francois Duchene, who in 1972 introduced the idea or perception of Europe as a 
“civilian power,” which means that the EU is a special international actor which 
contributes to creating stability by using economic and political means. Sjursen 
(Sjursen, 2004: 68) also refers to Manners, who has argued that the EU is a normative 
power in the world. He uses EU’s work to abolish death penalty as an example. In this 
material interests could not explain the EU’s effort, according to Manners (ibid: 68). 
The EU contributes to changing norms (ibid: 68).  
 
2.4 Path dependence5 
Path dependence is a term which is used to describe political processes (Pierson, 2000: 
251). In an article in American Political Science Review Paul Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 
251) argues that path dependence is a “social process grounded in a dynamic of 
“increasing returns.”” Here, I will present two different definitions of path 
dependence. The first one is by William Sewell and the other one by Margaret Levi. 
According to this first definition, path dependence means: 
“that what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.” (Sewell, 1996: 262-263) 
And this is the second definition of path dependence:  
“Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has 
started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but 
the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice.” (Levi, 1997: 28) 
                                            
5 A somewhat related, but not exactly the same term, is”forward linkage,” introduced by Leon N. Lindberg in 
1970. It is defined as a sequence in which an actor that has made a commitment to participate in a common 
decision-making process, has launched a process which has led to a marked increase in institutional capacities or 
the scope of the system (Knudsen, 1987: 101). This term will, however, not be used in the analysis. 
  20 
Further, Levi (Levi, 1997: 28) suggests that another metaphor would be more 
appropriate than a path, namely a tree. She uses the example of a climber who will 
continue to follow the same branch of a tree, despite the possibility of climbing other 
branches of the tree (ibid: 28).   
 Increasing returns is an example of path dependence and are also called self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes (Pierson, 2000: 251). With each move along 
a path the more likely it is that the actor will continue down that path; the reason for 
this is that there is an increase over time in the relative benefits of the current activity 
compared to other possible alternatives (ibid: 252). Increasing returns processes have a 
few characteristics: First, they are unpredictable, which means that there is no given 
outcome, because previous events to a strong degree affect the outcome and are “partly 
random.” (ibid: 253) Second, they are inflexible: Changing a path or entering another 
path is rather difficult; it is easier to change a path earlier in a process than at a later 
stage (ibid: 253). Third, nonergodicity is another characteristic of increasing returns 
processes; even small events in the beginning can affect future choices (ibid: 253). 
Finally, path inefficiency can be a problem (ibid: 253). 
 As Sewell (Sewell, 1996: 263) points out, “path dependence was initially 
formalized by economists”, but Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 257) argues that it can be used 
in the analysis of politics. Politics are conducive to increasing returns for four reasons, 
according to Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 257): First, collective action plays a central role 
in politics; second, there are many institutions in politics; third, it is possible to use 
political authority to increase power asymmetries and finally, politics are characterised 
by “complexity and opacity.” (Pierson, 2000: 257)  
 Politics are to a large extent characterised by collective action; decisions are 
taken collectively (ibid: 258). One principle of political life is to make conditions that 
are favourable to collective action (ibid: 258). The effectiveness of one’s actions 
depends much on other people’s action (ibid: 258). Coordination is necessary for 
political action (ibid: 258). Collective action processes are frequently subject to 
increasing returns, because adaptive expectations are quite common (ibid: 258). 
Adjustment of behaviour is necessary for actors, because of their expectations to other 
actors’ behaviour (ibid: 258). 
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 Not only collective action is subject to increasing returns. Institutions are also 
subject to increasing returns (ibid: 259). It has been documented that institutions start 
self-reinforcing processes, which makes it more difficult to reverse a course (ibid: 
259). According to Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 262) it is difficult to change public policies 
and formal institutions and they are supposed to be hard to change. There are two 
reasons for that: Those who have defined policies and have established institutions 
want to put limitations on what their successors can do (ibid: 262). And political actors 
will often have to impose restriction on what they themselves can do (ibid: 262).  
 Increasing returns processes also has an influence on power relations: A 
balanced conflict can be turned into a conflict where power is divided in an uneven 
way, so that open conflict is not necessary (ibid: 259). Increased power asymmetries 
can be the result of positive feedback over time (ibid: 259).  
 According to Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 260), learning in politics is considered 
hard and should not be expected to happen. Path dependence is common in politics 
(ibid: 260). Increasing returns processes are a central feature of politics (ibid: 260). 
There are psychological explanations to this phenomenon, according to Pierson 
(Pierson, 2000: 260): Politics are characterised by its complexity and opacity and the 
politicians are to a great extent biased (ibid: 260). Information is put into so-called 
mental maps: Positive information will probably be used, while negative information 
is removed (ibid: 260). Established ideologies and understandings of government are 
path dependent (ibid: 260). Collective action, institutional development, the exercise 
of authority and social interpretation are all characterised by positive feedback (ibid: 
260).  
 In cases that are path dependent, politics will be characterised by: Multiple 
equilibria, contingency, a critical role for timing and sequencing and inertia (ibid: 
263). Multiple equilibria mean that many outcomes are possible in case of a set of 
initial conditions that are conducive to increasing returns (ibid: 263). Contingency 
means this: If smaller events happen at the right time they can have large and lasting 
consequences (ibid: 263). Timing is very important in increasing returns processes. 
Earlier parts of a sequence have a larger impact than later parts (ibid: 263). Inertia 
means this: Positive feedback might cause single equilibrium if an increasing returns 
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process has been established (ibid: 263). According to Pierson (Pierson, 2000: 263), 
increasing returns processes are quite common in political life. 
 Path dependence and increasing returns are often used to explain policy stability 
(Pierson, 2000: 264). However, according to Wood (Wood, 2002: 375) increasing 
returns is not necessarily the best or only explanation for policy stability, but rather the 
interests of certain groups. Wood (Wood, 2002: 375) argues that efforts by political 
actors may ensure the continuation of a particular policy. This is one critique of path 
dependence. Further, Wood (Wood, 2002: 373) criticises path dependence for being 
deterministic. According to Wood (Wood, 2002: 372) there is a problem with path 
dependence explanations: Inertia is often exaggerated and there is little focus on the 
fact that there are changes in politics. He does not deny that increasing returns 
processes exist, but they do not necessarily lead to policy continuity and they are not 
sufficient to maintain policies or institutions (ibid: 374).  
 Within this theoretical perspective there is a strong focus on continuity, which 
seems to be taken for granted. But what if there is little or no continuity, or what if a 
certain policy is reversed? Another point here, when focusing on reversal, is the 
attention being paid to the costs of reversing a policy.  Are the costs of reversing a 
policy the only reason why decision makers choose to continue a certain policy? And 
finally, why do the relative benefits of the current activity increase over time? It seems 
that there is a strong belief that continuing a certain policy necessarily is advantageous 
and is that always the case? 
 
2.4.1 Path dependence in the EU 
What about the EU and its development policy? Do path dependence and increasing 
returns processes characterise political life within the Union? What about the 
development policy of the EU? The development policy goes back to the 1950’s and 
the Treaty of Rome. It has been changed and renegotiated several times, but there is a 
continuity here which is quite interesting. In the 1990’s the EU launched a process of 
reviewing its development policy towards the ACP countries. A Green Paper was 
published and it initiated a debate about the future of the relations between the EU and 
the ACP. Several options were discussed. But they ended up with a solution similar to 
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the previous years, a global agreement, but with some changes. Would the costs of 
radically changing the relations, or reversing the relations be too high for the EU? Did 
the EU actually have any choice but to continue its relations with the ACP group? 
 
2.5 Research question, theory and the analysis 
Just to repeat it, the research question asks about the driving forces for the EU in the 
process which led to the Cotonou Agreement. And there are two aspects of this; the 
interests and path dependence. In the first analytical chapter I will concentrate on three 
types of interests; economic interests, security interests and value-based interests. And 
in the second analytical chapter, in which path dependence is the theoretical 
framework, I will focus on whether there was any alternative than going on with the 
relations between the EU and the ACP States.  
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has been a presentation and discussion on two rather different theoretical 
perspectives. The first one was realism/neo-realism, with its long traditions in political 
science. Realists underline the fact that human nature constrains politics and that there 
is no international government. The international system is anarchic. States are 
considered rational actors; they have a certain military capability and are motivated by 
national interest, which mainly means security. The neo-realists emphasise the 
international anarchy. In addition to security interests, the neo-realists also focus on 
economic interests. Using this perspective is considered a bit problematic, as the actor 
in this case is not a state, but the European Union. The term “interest” will be an 
important part of the analysis. As we have seen in this chapter there are several types 
and definitions of “interests”, such as economic interests, security interests and value-
based interests. 
 The second theoretical perspective presented here was path dependence, 
traditionally used in economics, but also in the study of politics. Path dependence was 
defined by Pierson as a “social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns.” 
In addition to this definition I presented two other definitions of path dependence. 
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What happened at an earlier point in time will affect future events. And when an actor 
has launched a certain policy it will be difficult to reverse it due to high costs. 
Increasing returns is an example of path dependence. With each move down a path the 
more likely it is that the actor will continue down that path. Path dependence has been 
criticised, especially for being deterministic. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The methodology of a thesis depends on the research question. It is common to 
distinguish between quantitative and qualitative methods. In this thesis, in which I ask 
about the driving forces for the EU in the process towards the Cotonou Agreement, 
qualitative methods will be the most useful method. This chapter presents several ways 
of doing social science research, in particular the case study method, and it presents 
and discusses different sources of evidence. Finally, there is a discussion on validity 
and reliability. 
 
3.2 Case studies 
Social science research can be done in a number of ways, by conducting experiments, 
surveys, histories, analysing archival information, and finally, case studies (Yin, 1994: 
1). This thesis is a case study. The case study method is frequently used in political 
science (ibid: 1). How is a case study defined? According to Robert K. Yin (Yin, 1994: 
6) case studies can be used in order to answer how and why questions. Control over 
behavioural events is not necessary and they are studies of contemporary events (ibid: 
6). This is one definition of a case study: 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that  
· investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when 
· the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
(Yin, 1994: 13) 
Here is another definition of a case study:  
“the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries 
to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, 
and with what result.” (Schramm, 1971; Yin, 1994: 12, emphasis added) 
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There are several types of case studies, and Andersen (Andersen, 1997: 61; 94) 
distinguishes between unique cases and comparative case studies. This is one 
classification of case studies: Atheoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-
confirming, theory-infirming and deviant case studies (Collier, 1993: 107; Lijphart, 
1971). Andersen (Andersen, 1997) also distinguishes between six types of case 
studies: 1) Atheoretical case studies, which are mainly descriptive and do not aim to 
generalise (ibid: 64). Rather, the purpose is to present the social reality (ibid: 62); 2) 
theoretically interpretive case studies, of which the purpose is to use generalisations in 
order to throw light on special issues (ibid: 68); 3) case studies which aim to develop 
new theory (ibid: 73); 4) case studies which aim to develop new terms (ibid: 79); 5) 
case studies which aim to formulate new hypotheses (ibid: 82) and 6) case studies 
which test hypotheses (ibid 83). 
 
3.3 The process towards the Cotonou Agreement as a case study 
The purpose of this thesis is to find the driving forces for the EU in the process which 
led to the Cotonou Agreement. It asks why the EU decided to continue these relations, 
or in other words, the background, the driving forces. This means that a case study is 
an appropriate design for this thesis, although it deals with a phenomenon that took 
place about ten years ago, which means it is not really a contemporary phenomenon. 
On the other hand, the decision the EU made about going on is quite important here, 
which is in line with Schramm’s definition above. 
 As I mentioned in the introduction above, this is a qualitative study, not a 
quantitative study. The terms qualitative and quantitative say something about what 
type of data that is used in a thesis (Grønmo, 1996: 73). It is possible to combine these 
two methods. A qualitative study may have quantitative elements, or vice versa (ibid: 
74). However, this thesis is qualitative only, using qualitative data; mostly documents. 
I have performed one type of document analysis; qualitative content analysis, in which 
quotations are systematised in order to throw light on various issues or research 
questions. And this type of analysis is a good way of studying various arguments, 
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opinions, attitudes or values (ibid: 79). In this thesis quotations are an important part of 
the analysis. 
 It is a unique, theoretically interpretive case study, in which established terms 
and theories will be used as analytical tools. Andersen (Andersen, 1997: 69) defines 
interpretive case studies as studies in which terms and theories are tools helping to 
structure empirical material. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part of the 
analysis uses neo-realism and its different types of interests as analytical framework. 
The second part of the analysis uses path dependence as the analytical tool.  
 
3.4 Use of evidence 
One important principle in doing case studies is using evidence from at least two or 
more sources (Yin, 1994: 78). Yin (Yin, 1994: 78) mentions six types of evidence: 
Documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-
observation, and physical artefacts. Not all of them are relevant in this thesis. Sources 
like physical artefacts, direct observation and participant observation were considered 
irrelevant for this purpose. Doing interviews was considered, but it would mean 
travelling abroad, and the benefits of doing interviews are limited in this case. 
Although I could have received additional information in interviews, much depends on 
the respondents’ willingness to share information. Documents have been sufficient in 
this case.  
 Documents are the most important source of evidence in this case study. 
Examples of documents are letters, memoranda, communiqués, agendas, reports of 
events, administrative documents, formal studies or evaluations and newspaper articles 
(Yin, 1994: 81). Yin (Yin, 1994: 80) mentions these advantages of using 
documentation: One advantage is the documents’ stability, which means that they can 
be examined several times; documents were not written for case studies, or they are 
“unobtrusive,” which is another advantage; documents provide exact names, 
references and details and they usually cover a wide range of events and a long period 
of time, in addition to various settings. Further, Yin (Yin, 1994) mentions these 
disadvantages of using documentation: Getting access to the documents can be a 
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problem, because owners of the documents may not be willing to give access, or they 
will only give a limited access (ibid: 80). The owner of the documents will for 
example choose himself which documents the researcher get access to (ibid: 80). 
Another disadvantage is retrievability, which might be low (ibid: 80). The documents 
could also be strongly biased (80). 
 In this case the Internet has been the most useful source of evidence, and the 
EU’s website in particular. Not all documents/sources were available electronically, 
but I found them in libraries. Most of the documents/sources come from the European 
Commission. The documents/sources are mainly: 
· Communications, such as the guidelines for the negotiations 
· Discussion papers, like the Green Paper 
· Press releases 
· Speeches 
· Articles from  ACP-EU Courier, especially one interview 
· Negotiation memos. 
 
The sources of evidence mentioned so far are primary sources, perhaps except from 
the articles in ACP-EU Courier, which is published by the European Commission. 
There is no use of secondary sources in the analysis. Secondary sources have only 
been used for chapter four. In analysing the documents I have particularly focussed on 
finding quotations as evidence. 
 
3.5 Validity and reliability 
Validity says something about how relevant the data are for the research question in 
the thesis; it depends on what is being measured (Hellevik, 1999: 183). Reliability, on 
the other hand, refers to how things are being measured or the precision of the 
operations (ibid: 183).  
 One important question is to what extent the documents were relevant for the 
research questions. To what extent do the documents provide answers to the research 
question? Do the documents focus more on interests than with issues linked to path 
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dependence? The sources used in this thesis have mostly been relevant for the research 
question. The sources have been particularly useful and relevant for the first part of the 
analysis in particular. The sources have also been useful and relevant for the second 
part of the analysis, but to a smaller extent. However, the data could be considered 
valid in this case. 
 Another problem might be that the EU through these documents wants to 
present itself and its motives/interests in a more positive way than what is reality. The 
EU may want to give an impression that its motives or interests are mainly altruistic or 
noble. And the documents were not written for the purpose of a thesis, which means 
that the researcher has to be critical in studying the documents. 
 One problem of my sources of evidence is that they mainly come from the 
European Commission. It is not an ideal situation, which could affect reliability. As 
mentioned above, using multiple sources of evidence is an important principle in case 
studies, which increases reliability. Ideally, there should have been other sources in 
addition to those coming from the European Commission. It could be useful with 
documents that give information from another point of view. However, the European 
Commission is the EU institution that deals most with external relations and 
development, and the European Commission is a very important source in this case. It 
is natural that they provide most documentation. But I have used several documents, 
which is positive for reliability.  
 And their documents are mostly available. But getting access to documents 
might be a problem. By visiting the EU’s website it is possible to find many 
documents, or references to documents. Some documents do not exist electronically. 
But there are for sure documents that are not accessible. Why is access to documents 
blocked? I sent an email to the Council of the European Union, requesting access to a 
document about the negotiations. More precisely, the document was an information 
note with draft negotiating directives for a new partnership agreement with the ACP 
countries, referring to a mandate authorising the European Commission to start 
negotiations on a new agreement. I was denied access. Partial access was also denied. 
The argument was that it could weaken the position of the EU in similar negotiations. 
The question is whether these documents could have given valuable information for 
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this thesis. They could also have been interesting because they come from another EU 
institution, not the European Commission. 
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4 FROM ASSOCIATIONISM TO ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the history of the relations between the EU and the ACP 
countries, beginning in the 1950s with the Treaty of Rome. It was further developed 
with two Yaoundé Conventions and in the 1970s it turned into the Lomé Convention, 
which was renegotiated several times. In the 1990s the EU started reviewing its 
relations with the ACP countries, and eventually the Cotonou Agreement was signed 
in 2000, followed by negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements. 
 I will particularly focus on the contents of the various agreements and the 
changes that have been made through the years, especially changes made to the Lomé 
Convention. I have also chosen to pay particular attention to the process leading to the 
Cotonou Agreement, and specific attention to the Green Paper. The chapter ends with 
a look at the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements. 
 
4.2 The Treaty of Rome 
In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed, establishing the European Economic 
Community, consisting of six member states: France, West- Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Grilli, 1993: 9). France was the largest colonial 
power of these countries (ibid: 1), with many colonies in Africa (ibid: 9). And France 
led an active policy towards its colonies in Africa, with a policy of association (ibid: 
1). Associationism is a key word in describing the policy of EC towards the colonies. 
An association between the European Economic Community and the colonies in 
Africa was to be created, according to the Treaty of Rome (ibid: 8). Promoting the 
economic and social development of the colonies was an important objective (ibid: 8). 
Another objective was to develop close relations with the colonies and territories (ibid: 
8). The most important elements of the association system were trade and aid (ibid: 8). 
Abolishment of duties on imports between the EC and the associates and between the 
  32 
associates themselves was an important part of the Treaty (ibid: 8). Trade preferences 
were given to the colonies and territories (ibid: 11-12). A European Development 
Fund (EDF) was established in order to provide financial aid to the colonies (ibid: 8). 
Citizens from the EC countries and companies from the EC countries had the right to 
establish themselves in the associated territories and vice versa (ibid: 8-11). People 
from the territories and colonies had the right to apply for jobs in the EC countries and 
vice versa (ibid: 8). 
 
 
4.3 Yaoundé I and II 
At the end of the 1950s a process of decolonisation started (Grilli, 1993: 14) During 
the 1960s many colonies became independent states, and the first country to become 
independent was the Gold Coast, or Ghana as it is called today (ibid: 14). Many of the 
newly independent states were EC-associated territories (ibid: 14). After gaining 
independence they were no longer restricted by the articles of Treaty of Rome, but still 
they wanted preferential access to EC markets and financial aid (ibid: 15). These 
countries were still dependent on the EC countries, as the EC countries were their most 
important markets and the EC countries were the biggest aid donors (ibid: 15). This 
led to the need of a new agreement between the new independent states and the EC. 
 The first Yaoundé Convention was signed in July 1963. It was a Convention of 
Association between the EC and the Associated African and Malagasy States 
(AAMS). AAMS consisted of Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Brazzaville, Congo Leopoldville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta (ibid: 19). 
Yaoundé I came into effect in 1964 and lasted until 1969 (ibid: 19). 
 As with the Treaty of Rome, the central elements of the Yaoundé Convention 
were trade and aid: Trade preferences were maintained, but now only bilaterally (ibid: 
19). Free-trade areas were created between each of the AAMS and the EC, based on 
reciprocity (ibid: 19). Further, the new Convention called for reduction and later 
abolishment of trade obstacles between the AAMS and the EC (ibid: 19). Aid was 
given both multilaterally and bilaterally (ibid: 19-20). The European Development 
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Fund was further developed (ibid: 20). It was stated that the purposes were to develop 
the industries and diversify the economies of the associated states (ibid: 28). Yaoundé 
I also had an institutional dimension; three institutions were established: An 
Association Council, consisting of one representative from each of the six EC 
members and the 18 AAMS, had a supervisory function (ibid: 20). A Parliamentary 
Conference was established in order to create a dialogue between the EC and the 
AAMS (20-21). It was composed of members of the European Parliament and the 
national assemblies of the various AAMS (ibid: 21). There was also a Court of 
Arbitration which was supposed to resolve conflicts between the parties; it was led by 
a president and consisted of four judges (ibid: 20-21). 
 Yaoundé II replaced the first Yaoundé Convention. It was nearly identical to the 
first convention (ibid: 28). It lasted from 1969 till 1975, which was the year Lomé was 
signed (ibid: 28). 
 
4.4 Towards Lomé 
In 1963 the member states of the EC signed a Declaration of Intent, a declaration 
giving countries that had “production structures comparable to those of the 
Associates” a chance to become a part of the association (Grilli, 1993: 21). This 
declaration was strongly supported by Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, while 
France was more sceptical (ibid: 21). 
 Trade preferences were important to developing countries, and many of them 
worked to attain such preferences (ibid: 23). The EU responded by introducing the 
Generalized System of Preferences in 1971, in which trade preferences were given 
according to development level and in which the poorest countries received the biggest 
preferences (ibid: 23). 
 In 1973 the EC was enlarged for the first time: Three countries entered the EC: 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, which had also been a colonial power 
(Brown, 2002: 44). However, there was a great challenge here and that was the British 
Commonwealth’s relationship to the EC (ibid: 44). Britain did not show any 
willingness to reduce the role of the Commonwealth, and that led to a French veto to 
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British membership in the EC in the early 1960s (ibid: 44). In 1970 Britain applied for 
membership again and Britain joined the EC in 1973, under a few conditions (ibid: 
44). Britain was forced to accept the system of preferential association with various 
regions (ibid: 45). When Britain entered the EC, the Commonwealth countries were 
classified as either associable or non-associable, in accordance with the Declaration of 
Intent mentioned above (ibid: 45). The associable countries were former British 
colonies in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific, while other countries within the 
Commonwealth, such as Hong Kong and Australia are all industrialised countries, and 
then non-associable (ibid: 45). The associable countries could choose between three 
types of agreement with the EC: First, one alternative was a joint or separate 
association agreement which would replace the Yaoundé Convention; second an 
association agreement or agreements in accordance with Art. 238 of the Treaty of 
Rome, and the last option was a trade agreement based on reciprocity in accordance 
with Art. 113 of the Treaty of Rome (ibid: 45).  
 The beginning of the 1970s was marked by a global economic crisis, in contrast 
to the period from the 1950s onwards that was characterised by great economic growth 
(ibid: 46). The early 1970s marked the end of this growth: The Bretton Woods system, 
which had regulated the post-war global economy, broke down (ibid: 46). The gold 
standard was abandoned (ibid: 46). Important key words to describe this period are 
overaccumulation of capital, speculative investment, stagflation and decline in 
industrial production (ibid: 46). 
 The early 1970s was clearly a difficult time for the developing countries too. 
These states, which were newly independent, were economically weak and did not 
have a strong position in the international system, in addition to political problems at 
home (ibid: 47). Financial crises and lack of revenue were among the problems these 
countries were facing (ibid: 47). The developing countries demanded a new 
international economic order and they clearly wanted a stronger international position, 
as well as more support (ibid: 46-47). At the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development the Third World presented these demands: 1) more influence in 
international institutions; 2) trade-related demands such as better market access and 
support for commodity prices; 3) it was important for the developing countries to 
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ensure the right to protect their economies; 4) they demanded an increase in transfer of 
technology and 5) a changed International Law of the Sea (ibid: 48).  
 If the Third World wanted more influence, then some of the countries were able 
to gain some influence for a while, due to the commodity crisis (ibid: 49). In the early 
1970s commodity prices increased heavily, due to cuts in stocks, an increased demand 
and market speculation (ibid: 50). In 1973 there was a war in the Middle East and then 
OPEC, the organisation of petroleum exporting countries, imposed an embargo on oil 
exports which was targeted at the USA and Israel (ibid: 50). The oil prices increased 
heavily in 1973-74 (ibid: 50). It was a difficult time for European countries as they 
were dependent on imported oil and other raw materials (Grilli, 1993: 26).  
 In the beginning of the 1970s there was willingness within the EC to continue 
the relations with the developing countries (Brown, 2002: 51), and there are several 
factors that explain why: The commodity crisis and the crisis in the world economy are 
two reasons for this interest (ibid: 51). Other reasons are the demands for a new 
international economic order, which gave the developing countries some influence, 
and the fact that almost half of EC imports came from developing countries, mostly 
raw materials (ibid: 51).  
 
4.5 The negotiations 
In the beginning of the 1970s the Commission started working on formulating a policy 
in order to find an agreement that could replace the Yaoundé Convention (Brown, 
2002: 52). In April 1973 the Deniau Memorandum was published (ibid: 53). 
According to this document the associative relationship was to be enlarged and 
deepened and this relationship would comprise the associates, the associable 
Commonwealth and sub-Saharan African countries “with comparable products and 
structure” (ibid: 53). Further, the so-called reverse preferences would be abolished 
(ibid: 53). It called for the establishment of a system that would stabilise the export 
earnings of the associates (ibid: 53). Equality was an important principle and the EC 
would not interfere in the associates’ policies (ibid: 53). Finally, it proposed an 
institutional structure (ibid: 53). 
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 The ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) presented its demands in 
1973, which were mostly related to trade: They demanded non-reciprocity, free market 
access, that export earnings are secured and transfer of technology, in addition to 
revision of rules of origin provision and rules that control movement of capital to 
ensure monetary independence (ibid: 55). Further, the ACP countries demanded that 
aid is separated from trade and that intra-African cooperation is protected (ibid: 55). 
 The real negotiations began with a ministerial conference in October 1973 (ibid: 
56). The parties had already met in July in Brussels to present their positions (ibid: 
56). Until spring 1974 the parties had only managed to agree on objectives of aid and 
trade cooperation (ibid: 56). Apart from that not much progress was being made and as 
a consequence the EC was invited by the ACP countries to a ministerial conference in 
Jamaica’s capital Kingston in July 1974 (ibid: 56). Progress was certainly made in 
Kingston (ibid: 56). In Kingston, the EC and the ACP States agreed on non-
reciprocity, a system that would stabilise export earnings, administration and coverage 
of aid and a chapter about industrial development (ibid: 57). The new convention was 
signed in Togo’s capital Lomé on 28 February (ibid: 58). 
 
4.6 The Lomé Convention6 
Trade cooperation was important in the Lomé Convention and a central objective of 
the agreement was promotion of trade between the EC and the ACP countries: The 
parties wanted to increase the growth of trade of the ACP states and to give the ACP 
States better conditions of access to the EC market (Lomé Convention, 1975: Art. 1).7 
An important principle in this context was abolishment of customs duties and charges 
on products made in the ACP states (ibid: Art. 2). There would be no quantitative 
restrictions on imports of products made in the ACP states to the EC (ibid: Art. 3). 
Trade promotion activities were an important part in enabling the ACP States to 
                                            
6 Its full name is ACP-EEC CONVENTION SIGNED AT LOME on 28 February 1975, but I will only refer to it 
as the “Lome Convention.” 
7 I have chosen to refer to the articles of the Convention. 
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participate in world trade (ibid: Art. 12). The ACP States were supposed to participate 
in fairs and exhibitions (ibid: Art. 13). 
 The Lomé Convention came up with an “invention”: Stabilisation of export 
earnings. The ACP countries, as exporters of raw materials, are particularly vulnerable 
due to price fluctuations; the quantity of the products can also cause instability in 
export earnings (ibid: Art. 16). This system, often called STABEX, would ensure that 
export earnings of the ACP States’ products are stabilised (ibid: Art. 16). The new 
system covered commodities such as groundnuts, cocoa, coffee, cotton, coconut 
products, palm, palm nut, kernel products, raw hides, skins and leather, wood 
products, bananas, tea, raw sisal and iron ore (ibid: Art. 17). 
 Industrial cooperation was important in the Lomé Convention, due to lack of 
industrial development in the ACP states: The parties agreed on the necessity of such 
cooperation and the central objective was “to promote the development and 
diversification of industry in the ACP states” (Lomé Convention, 1975: Art. 26). 
Creating new industrial relations between the EC and the ACP states was another 
objective, in addition to supporting the transfer of technology to the ACP states (ibid: 
Art. 26). The EC was supposed to support the development of infrastructure (ibid: Art. 
28).   
 There was also a great focus on financial and technical cooperation, of which 
the objective was “to correct the structural imbalances in the various sectors of the 
ACP states’ economies” (Lomé Convention, 1975: Art. 40). Programmes and projects 
would be launched in order to develop the ACP states economically and socially (ibid: 
Art. 40). Development was defined as “greater wellbeing of the population, 
improvement of the economic situation of the state, local authorities and firms, and the 
introduction of structures and factors whereby such improvement can be continued and 
extended by their own means” (Lomé Convention, 1975: Art. 40). Special treatment 
would be given to the least developed countries and their needs when implementing 
the financial and technical cooperation (ibid: Art. 48). According to the Lomé 
Convention the parties would cooperate on implementing aid measures and the ACP 
states were supposed to play an active role in programming, preparations and 
execution of projects (ibid: Art. 50).  
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 An important principle in the Lomé Convention was non-discrimination: On the 
one hand the ACP states could not discriminate citizens and companies from EC 
countries (ibid: Art. 62). Neither could the EU discriminate citizens and companies 
from ACP States (ibid: Art. 62). 
 As with the two Yaoundé Conventions, the Lomé Convention had an 
institutional dimension. Three institutions were established: The Council of Ministers, 
the Committee of Ambassadors and the Consultative Assembly (ibid: Art. 69). The 
Council of Ministers consisted of members of the Council of the European 
Communities and of members of the Commission of the European Communities and 
of a member of the Government of each of the ACP states (ibid: Art. 70). Among the 
tasks, the Council of Ministers was supposed to formulate “the broad outlines of the 
work” to be done in the context of the Convention; examining what has been achieved 
and was also given some decision-making power (Lomé Convention, 1975: Art. 74). 
The Committee of Ambassadors consisted of one representative of each member state 
of the EC and one representative of the Commission and one representative of each 
ACP state (ibid: Art. 76). Its role was mainly to assist the Council of Ministers in its 
work, while other tasks or duties for the Committee were to be decided by the Council 
of Ministers (ibid: Art. 77). The Consultative Assembly consisted of members of the 
Assembly of the EC and representatives appointed by each of the ACP states (ibid: 
Art. 80). The Lomé Convention was not very specific on the functions of this body. 
 Finally, the parties agreed that the projects and programmes should result in 
“growth of the national income of each ACP State; improvement of the standard of 
living and the social-cultural levels of populations and of the most underprivileged in 
particular; the establishment of more balanced economic relations between the ACP 
States and other countries, their greater participation in world trade in general, 
including, in particular, trade in manufactured products; improvement and control of 
the conditions of development, in particular physical factors and technical know-how: 
diversification and integration of the structure of the economy on both a sectoral and a 
geographical basis; regional co-operation between ACP States and, where appropriate, 
between ACP countries and other developing countries” (Lomé Convention, 1975: 
Art. 1, Annex IX, Protocol No. 2, Chapter 1).  
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4.7 The ACP group 
In 1975 the Georgetown Agreement was signed, establishing the ACP Group 
Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: 115). The ACP Group is an international organisation, 
which means that the EU has no power to force the group to accept new members; 
neither can the ACP Group be dissolved by the EU (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: 115). 
Currently the ACP Group consists of 79 member states (List of ACP Countries, 
http://www.acp.int). The organisation has four institutions: The Summit; the Council 
of Ministers; the Committee of Ambassadors and the Meeting of ACP 
Parliamentarians (ACP INSTITUTIONS, http://www.acpsec.org). The Summit of 
ACP Heads of State and Government is the organ of highest importance in the ACP 
and is responsible for defining the guidelines (ibid). Since 1997 there have been four 
summits, in Gabon, Dominican Republic and Fiji and Mozambique (ibid). The Council 
of Ministers make the decisions and implements guidelines defined by the Summit 
(ibid). There is also a Committee of Ambassadors, which is the second decision-
making body and which assists the Council of Ministers, in addition to monitoring the 
implementation of the Cotonou Agreement (ibid). Finally, the fourth institution of the 
ACP Group is the Meeting of ACP Parliamentarians, or ACP members of the ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which has an advisory role (ibid). 
 
4.8 The renegotiations 
4.8.1 From Lomé I to Lomé II 
The Lomé Convention was renegotiated every five years. As we will see, there have 
been quite a few changes to the Lomé Convention over the years, of which the most 
dramatic are the introduction of structural adjustment and political conditionality, with 
its strong focus on democracy and human rights. The first renegotiations began in the 
late 1970s, a period that was marked by recession (Brown, 2002: 64). And the work to 
introduce a new international economic order had not been successful (ibid: 64). 
 The ACP States were not satisfied with what they had achieved in the first 
Lomé Convention (ibid: 64), and as a consequence these were their most important 
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demands for Lomé II: Free access, without any restrictions, to the EC market for their 
products, including agricultural products; that the rules of origin were changed; 
abandonment of the safeguard clause for ACP products, that aid is paid out faster; 
more aid; an extension of STABEX to cover all exports from the ACP countries and 
finally a fund reserved for industrial cooperation (ibid: 64). 
 The EC, on the other hand, wanted to continue its relations with the ACP States, 
but the EC was not willing to concede much to the ACP States (ibid: 65). However, 
the EC had two proposals: The first proposal was to incorporate a human rights clause 
into the Lomé Convention (ibid: 65). Second, the EC proposed to establish a system 
similar to STABEX in the minerals sector, due to a decline in investments in this 
sector in Africa (ibid: 65).  
 
4.8.2 Lomé II- important changes 
There were not many new elements in Lomé II. The new convention introduced a 
system for the stabilisation of the minerals sector in ACP countries, called SYSMIN 
(ibid: 65). STABEX was extended (ibid: 66). The ACP would receive more aid (ibid: 
66). There was also a greater focus on rural development, which led to the 
establishment of a Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development (ibid: 
66). 
 While succeeding in introducing SYSMIN into the Lomé Convention, the EU 
failed to incorporate the human rights clause into Lomé II, due to protests by the ACP 
countries, which feared that it would limit their sovereignty (ibid: 66). However, the 
ACP States could not be satisfied, as they did not get the changes they had hoped for 
(ibid: 67). 
 
4.8.3 New negotiations – Lomé III 
Again, the Lomé Convention was renegotiated. This period, the early 1980s was 
marked by recession, debt crisis and food crisis and famines in Africa (Brown, 2002: 
67). In 1982 the EC Commission published the so-called Pisani Memorandum (ibid: 
68). It was named after the Commissioner for Development, Edgard Pisani (ibid: 67). 
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By publishing this document the EC tried to reformulate its development policy, based 
on criticism against the Lomé Convention and aid projects which had not improved the 
conditions in the ACP countries (ibid: 68). Pisani argued in favour of programmes 
with a sectoral and regional focus, and for Africa he wanted more focus on rural 
development (ibid: 68). Pisani was somewhat sceptical towards aid conditionality, but 
supported a discussion, or a political dialogue, between the donor and the recipients 
(ibid: 68). 
 The negotiations for Lomé III began in October 1983 and Lomé III was signed 
in December 1984 (ibid: 69). In that period the ACP states had serious economic 
problems: The commodity prices were declining, their exports were declining while 
their debt was increasing (ibid: 69). As before previous negotiations, their demands 
were mostly related to trade, such as completely free market access; changed rules of 
origin; restrictions on safeguards; STABEX to be extended; compensation for reduced 
purchasing power; maintaining their trade preferences and “real joint management of 
Lomé aid” (ibid: 69). As with Lomé II, the ACP countries did not succeed (ibid: 69). 
The EC were, as before not willing to give concessions to the ACP States, but 
focussed instead on introducing policy dialogue (ibid: 69).  
 
4.8.4 Lomé III- what was new? 
The introduction of policy dialogue was the most important change of Lomé III, but 
the ACP countries were rather sceptical to this new element (ibid: 69). The purpose of 
such a dialogue was to ensure that cooperation and aid operation worked effectively 
(Brown, 2002: 69). Another change to the Lomé Convention was “more thematic aid 
actions” (ibid: 70). Rural and agricultural development, development of fisheries, 
industrial development, mining and energy, drought and desertification were given 
higher priority (ibid: 70). Again, STABEX was extended (ibid: 70). 
 In Lomé III the institutional dimension was given some attention. The ACP-
EEC Council of Ministers was given a more important role (ibid: 70). Because of the 
new policy dialogue the Consultative Assembly got a new name, the ACP-EEC Joint 
Assembly (ibid: 70). There were only minor changes in the field of trade (ibid: 70). 
And in Lomé III there was a mention of human rights and that was something new 
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(ibid: 70). As we will see, it would play a greater role in the next renegotiations of the 
Lomé Convention. 
 
4.8.5 New trends in development policy- structural adjustment 
In the 1980s there were changes in the international aid regime (ibid: 73), and there 
was a serious debt crisis, which dominated the economies of the developing countries 
(ibid: 75-76). In the 1970s the developing countries were borrowing money from 
western banks, but later the interest rates increased; at the same time the commodity 
prices fell, due to reduced demand as consequences of recession (ibid: 76). The terms 
of trade for commodity exports got worse (ibid: 76). In 1979 the oil price increased, 
and the same year Mexico declared that it could not pay its debt (ibid: 76). This led to 
reluctance in the western part of the world to give more loans to developing countries 
(ibid: 76). Economic liberalism became the dominant trend internationally (ibid: 75). 
 While the Third World lost much of the influence they had gained during the 
commodity crisis, the donors were gaining more influence at the expense of the 
developing countries (ibid: 73). The donors, led by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), paid more attention to the economic management, 
governance and the political systems of the developing states (ibid: 73-74). These 
institutions had to handle debt repayment and make sure that the developing countries 
repaid their debt, as it was important to avoid a financial collapse (ibid: 77). The 
donors also had to handle structural economic imbalances in developing countries 
(ibid: 77). The donors demanded that the debtor countries implement so-called 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) before they could receive new loans or 
before they were allowed to repay their debts later than originally agreed (ibid: 77). 
 In 1981 the World Bank published the so-called Berg Report which argued that 
the developing countries should reduce state intervention, denationalise industry and 
abandon protectionism (ibid: 77). Later, both the World Bank and IMF published the 
Washington Consensus, which was a presentation of their neoliberal policies: They 
called for “currency devaluation; public expenditure cuts; freeing of prices; positive 
interest rates and a squeeze on credit to combat inflation; import liberalisation; and 
privatization” (Brown, 2002: 77-78). They believed this would reduce consumption, 
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which again would make the developing countries less dependent on loans and that by 
encouraging them to increased exports, debt would be repaid (Brown, 2002: 78). 
However, during the 1980s the debt of the developing countries increased heavily 
(ibid: 81). In the 1990s the donors, led by the World Bank made an effort to reduce the 
debt, by launching the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (ibid: 82).  
 The Structural Adjustment Programmes have been criticised by NGOs, which 
have declared that they want adjustment that is more humane (ibid: 82). They have 
pointed at social problems, such as higher rates of unemployment, declining wages, 
reduced social welfare and an increase in food prices, which are caused by economic 
reforms (ibid: 82). This criticism led the donors to focus more on “the social 
dimensions of adjustment” (ibid: 83). In the beginning, the donors did not pay much 
attention to the institutional aspects of reform, but later they acknowledged that 
economic reforms are not sufficient; it was necessary to focus on the institutions in the 
developing countries as well (ibid: 83).  
 
4.8.6 Towards Lomé IV 
The concept of structural adjustment also made its way to the negotiations of a new 
Lomé Convention, which was negotiated in the late 1980s (Brown, 2002: 86). Before 
the negotiations started the EC Commission made it clear that they did not want to 
change much of the Convention, but they wanted to incorporate structural adjustment 
to the Lomé Convention (ibid: 87). It was important to maintain the basic structure of 
the Lomé Convention (ibid: 87). 
 The ACP countries demanded an abolishment of all trade barriers for their 
exports to the EU; less strict rules-of-origin criteria and safeguard provisions of Lomé; 
a less complex SYSMIN; an extension of STABEX and that their purchasing power is 
protected (ibid: 87). Further, the ACP States argued that population increases should 
be one factor that determines aid levels (ibid: 87). The ACP group accepted structural 
adjustment as a part of the Lomé Convention, but the EC had to be independent of the 
World Bank and IMF (ibid: 87-88). Finally, they demanded that the Commission 
worked to reduce their debt, and that the debt of the least developed countries would 
be cancelled (ibid: 88). 
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 The negotiations began in October 1988 at a meeting of the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers in Luxembourg (ibid: 88). As usual, there was no fast progress, but 
eventually the parties reached an agreement (ibid: 88). In November 1989 the parties 
agreed upon a new convention, which was signed in Lomé, Togo, in December the 
same year (ibid: 88). 
 
4.8.7 Lomé IV: the changes 
There were several changes to the fourth Lomé Convention. First, there was an 
increase in the level of aid, about 40 per cent (ibid: 90). The rules on implementation 
of aid were changed (ibid: 90). More businesses and non-governmental actors (NGOs) 
could now receive aid (ibid: 90). Lomé IV also paid much more attention to human 
rights, which was exactly what the EC wanted (ibid: 91). Lomé IV stated that 
development “…entails respect for and promotion of all human rights” and “that 
development policy and cooperation are closely linked with the respect for and 
enjoyment of fundamental human rights” (Brown, 2002: 91). These are all human 
rights: “…non-discriminatory treatment, fundamental human rights; civil and political 
rights; and economic, social and cultural rights” (Brown, 2002: 91). 
 Environmental cooperation was now a part of the Lomé Convention. For 
example, transportation of toxic waste between the EC and the ACP countries was 
prohibited (ibid: 91). Lomé IV also contained articles on commodities, enterprise 
development and services (ibid: 91). In the field of trade there were no major changes, 
but duties on some products covered by CAP were either withdrawn or reduced (ibid: 
91). And, as usual there was an extension of STABEX (ibid: 92). 
 The Lomé Conventions usually lasted for five years and then they were 
renegotiated, as we have seen. But with Lomé IV it was different: It was to last for ten 
years instead of five and the Financial Protocol and other articles as well, could be 
renegotiated twelve months before the first Financial Protocol expired in March 1995 
(Brown, 2002: 92).  
  The most important change to the Lomé Convention was introducing 
adjustment. The EC wanted a somewhat different approach to adjustment than that of 
the World Bank and IMF; it was characterised as more “pragmatic” and 
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“differentiated” (Brown, 2002: 98). Avoiding additional social problems in the ACP 
countries was important to the EC (ibid: 98). The purpose of giving support to 
adjustment was to stimulate growth in GDP; increase employment rates; diversify the 
economies of the ACP States; develop private sector; “improve public sector 
management” and “improve balance of payments and foreign exchange performance” 
(Brown, 2002: 98). According to Lomé IV all ACP States could receive support for 
adjustment (ibid: 99). 
 
4.8.8 Another new trend: Political conditionality 
In the 1990s the major donors, like the United States, Britain, France, Germany and 
Japan, together with the World Bank and the European Union (EU) began focussing 
on the political systems of the recipient countries, by introducing conditionality 
(Brown, 2002: 116). Conditionality means that countries which show no willingness to 
introduce political reform will not receive aid from the donors (Brown, 2002: 116). 
There is a particular focus on improving governmental and administrative capacity, on 
promoting human rights and on promoting democracy (ibid: 116). Paying attention to 
governance was a response to the problems of adjustment: The World Bank was the 
leading actor here and acknowledged that focussing on market reforms is not enough 
and that good governance is important for development to be successful (ibid: 117). 
The donors had to acknowledge that the developing countries were not able to 
implement all parts of the Structural Adjustment Programmes due to poor 
administrative capacity (ibid: 118). As a consequence, various measures, such as 
“support for policy formulation, institutional strengthening, reform of the civil service 
and reform and privatisation of public enterprises, anti-corruption measures, 
improvement in accounting, accountability and transparency and strengthening the rule 
of law” were introduced (Brown, 2002: 118). 
 In the 1990s more attention was also being paid to human rights, both in foreign 
policy and in aid regime (ibid: 120). Most of the larger donors, like the EU, have 
warned that they will withhold aid in cases of violation of human rights (ibid: 120). 
When it comes to democracy, donors have paid more attention to elections and multi-
party systems rather than democratic values, of which participation is considered 
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important (ibid: 121). The EU, however, has paid more attention to these democratic 
values (ibid: 121). 
 
4.8.9 The EU and political conditionality 
In November 1991 the Council of Ministers passed a resolution called Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development, which stated that the EC should emphasise democracy 
and human rights in its development policy, and in particular focussing on elections; 
democratic institutions, the rule of law and the legal systems and the civil society in 
the ACP States, in addition to more decentralisation of development cooperation 
(Brown, 2002: 125). And the resolution stated that aid could be withheld if there is 
evidence of violation of human rights and democratic processes are stopped (ibid: 
125). The EU has withheld aid to several ACP states, based on Article 5 in Lomé IV 
(ibid: 126). The article 5 in Lomé IV stated that development cooperation “…entails 
respect for and promotion of all human rights” (Brown, 2002: 126).  
 
4.8.10 Towards a new development policy for the EU – Horizon 2000 
The process of changing the EU’s development policy in the 1990s is explained by 
these factors: Greater European integration, the end of the Cold War and the fact that 
the EU got more interests in other developing countries than the ACP Group and in 
Eastern Europe (Brown, 2002: 127). In 1992 the Commission published a document 
known as Horizon 2000, in which the EU stated it wanted a new development policy 
due to the international changes, such as the end of the Cold War (ibid: 127). 
According to this document, the most important objective of development policy is 
integrating the developing countries into the world economy (ibid: 127). Further, this 
document argued for more conditionality (ibid: 127). Inefficiency had been a problem 
in the development policy (ibid: 127). It also blamed the policies and structures in 
developing countries for the lack of success (ibid: 127). The document argued that 
countries like Japan and the USA could contribute more to aid programmes for Africa, 
so that the EU could give more aid to the relations with Latin-America and Asia (ibid: 
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128). And it suggested introducing a “uniform range of development policies for 
countries at different levels of development” (Brown, 2002: 128). The document also 
revealed a very positive attitude to multilateral trade liberalisation (ibid: 128). 
 
4.8.11 The mid-term review of Lomé IV  
As mentioned above, Lomé IV was supposed to last for ten years. However, the 
financial protocol had to be renegotiated (Brown, 2002: 128). But they ended up 
negotiating about other issues as well (ibid: 128). Due to changes and events in the 
recent years, it was necessary with a review of the entire Convention; it was claimed 
by the European Commission (ibid: 128-129). On the other hand, the ACP countries 
made it clear that they did not want a full renegotiation of the Lomé Convention (ibid: 
129). In May 1994 the negotiations were opened at the ACP-EU ministerial meeting in 
Swaziland (ibid: 129). As usual there was not much progress being made in the 
beginning, but they managed to agree on a number of issues in late 1994 (ibid: 129). 
They agreed on trade issues in early 1995, while the most complicated issues were 
about aid (ibid: 129). In June 1995 the parties agreed upon a revised Lomé IV, which 
was signed in Mauritius in November the same year (ibid: 129). 
 In the revised Lomé IV there was a larger focus on human rights and democracy 
(ibid: 129). The article 5 states that respect for human rights, democratic principles and 
the rule of law are “essential” elements of the Convention (Brown, 2002: 130). In this 
case the parties agreed on a mechanism of suspension if there are any violations of 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law (ibid: 130). Promotion of 
decentralized cooperation was also important in the revised Lomé IV (ibid: 130). The 
EU had proposed an establishment of fund that should support “democratization and 
good government in the ACP states” (Brown, 2002: 130). The parties agreed on this 
fund (ibid: 130). The EU and the ACP States agreed on the importance of creating 
good conditions for developing a market economy and a private sector (ibid: 130). 
 The European Commission gained more influence on how the ACP transfers 
could be used (ibid: 133). There were only small changes to Lomé trade regulations, 
like improved market access with reduced tariffs (ibid: 134). The level of aid was also 
increased (ibid: 135). 
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4.9 Towards Cotonou:  
4.9.1 The Green Paper 
As I have shown above, the EU started a process of reformulating their development 
policy in the 1990s by publishing a document called Horizon 2000. This process 
continued when the European Commission published the so-called Green Paper on 
relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st 
century. Challenges and options for a new partnership in 1996 (European Commission, 
1996). 
 The starting point in the Green Paper is the global challenges that would affect 
the relations between the EU and the ACP countries. The Green Paper lists a number 
of factors: “Economic globalisation and interdependence, the ever faster spread of 
technological innovation, uneven demographic trends and the end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of a multipolar world” (European Commission, 1996: 1-2). The EU 
clearly states its intentions:  
 
“In this new context, both for internal reasons and in order to respond to external demands, the 
European Union will affirm its political standing by adopting a more effective, more global 
common foreign policy. North-South relations will be one of the first strands of this policy: 
Europe can thus affirm its identity in adding a new dimension to the special relationship 
between the Union and ACP countries.” (European Commission, 1996: 3) 
  
 The Green Paper provides an assessment of the ACP-EU relations. It is obvious 
that the objectives of earlier conventions have not been achieved; or in other words, it 
has not been successful: The partnership has not worked very well (ibid: 12). The EU 
puts the blame on institutions and administrations in some ACP countries for the 
problematic economic and sectoral policy dialogue (ibid: 12). The positive effect of 
aid operations have been reduced due to problems of institutional and economic policy 
in many ACP countries (ibid: 13). Disagreement about political priorities has been a 
problem, which could explain inefficiency (ibid: 14). Trade preferences were central to 
the Lomé Convention, but in Green Paper there is a rather negative attitude to such 
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trade preferences, which probably will be abandoned, due to multilateral trade 
liberalisation (ibid: 16). Further, the EU argues that the trade preferences did not have 
a positive impact on export growth and diversification (ibid: 17). These problems led 
to the need to consider the following aspects of EU –ACP relations: “the foundations 
of future partnership, the EU’s priorities and resource allocation criteria, aid 
conditionality and selectiveness, capacity building and a new trade chapter” (European 
Commission, 1996: 18-19). 
 Chapter III of the Green Paper gives an assessment of socio-economic change 
in ACP states. It has not been satisfactory and Sub-Saharan Africa is mentioned as the 
region with most problems (ibid: 21). Lack of political stability is a problem in many 
ACP countries and some of these states could be characterised as “dysfunctional” 
(ibid: 25). Despite all the problems, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced increased 
economic growth because prices on raw materials have increased (ibid: 31). In South 
Africa there has been a transition to democracy (ibid: 31). There have also been 
improvements in the franc Zone in West Africa, East Africa and in the Caribbean 
countries (ibid: 32). 
 Socio-political developments in the ACP States and political and economical 
changes internationally have created new development conditions (ibid: 33). The 
following factors are important for cooperation in the future: “Support for adjustment 
policies, the importance of credibility and good governance, the need for increasing 
attention to be paid to the environmental aspects of sustainable development, the need 
to adopt differentiated approaches, trade arrangements established in accordance with 
specific criteria and objectives, the importance of making progress in managing the 
external debt, the advantages of a cooperation policy which encompasses the whole of 
the sub-Saharan African regions, the particular difficulties of the Caribbean ACP 
countries and their trade strategies in a rapidly developing regional framework and 
problems peculiar to the small island economies of the Pacific” (European 
Commission, 1996: 33-35). 
 According to the Green Paper, the EU has for a long time been a major donor of 
development aid (ibid: 37). The relations with the ACP States are considered a part of 
an international strategy to reduce poverty (ibid: 37). But the EU claims it has 
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“objective interests” (European Commission, 1996: 37). And the EU claims it has “an 
interest in promoting peace and stability, more effective international cooperation to 
manage global threats, solidarity, economic development and mutual interest and the 
social and environmental aspects of development” (European Commission, 1996: 38). 
 The EU Commission argues strongly in favour of a strengthened partnership, 
despite the problems mentioned above (ibid: 39). It is considered the best type of 
cooperation (ibid: 39). The political dimension is important here and it must be 
strengthened (ibid: 39). 
 It is argued that more effort is needed in order to help the ACP states to open 
their markets for trade with the EU and other partners (ibid: 41). But in order to do that 
this cooperation framework must be changed in different ways: More differentiation is 
necessary (ibid: 41). The policy dialogue must be improved (ibid: 42). Cooperation 
could be improved in some fields, and the parties could start cooperation in new fields 
(ibid: 42). Finally, non-governmental actors should be more involved in development 
cooperation (ibid: 42). 
 Another issue was the future of the structure of the relations between the ACP 
and the EU. An important question is whether it should be maintained or not (ibid: 43). 
Or should it be extended? (ibid: 43) Four different options are discussed in the Green 
Paper: Having a global agreement like the Lomé Convention, but with differentiation; 
having a global agreement plus bilateral agreements; regional agreements and finally, 
a cooperation agreement with the least developed countries (ibid: 44-45). 
 Chapter V of the Green Paper deals with the alternatives for a new EU 
cooperation policy with the ACP states. The Green Paper suggests a reorganisation of 
the cooperation with the ACP to focus on three particular areas; the social and 
economic dimension; the institutional dimension and the public sector and finally, 
trade and investment (ibid: 48). In chapter VI financial and technical cooperation are 
discussed. One question is whether there should be a single source of funds or multiple 
smaller sources (ibid: 70). Another question is whether the level of aid should be given 
according to need or according to performance by the ACP States (ibid: 71). There is 
also a discussion on types of aid, like project aid or direct budget aid (ibid: 73-74). 
Another central question being discussed is whether there should be co-management, 
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EU-only management or autonomous management by the recipient countries (ibid: 
76). 
 
4.9.2 The negotiations 
The Green Paper led to a debate about the future of the EU-ACP relations; the debate 
was mainly held as consultation forums organised by the European Commission in the 
Member States and in the ACP regions (European Commission, 1997: 6). Other actors 
participating were non-governmental organisations, the private sector, trade unions 
and development-studies centres (ibid: 6). The European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee have also contributed to the debate and there have been some 
written contributions (ibid: 6). The debate demonstrated that the parties were 
determined to continue the relations (DRAFT SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE COUNCIL AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY FOR THE ACP-EC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (COTONOU, BENIN, 23 JUNE 2000), 
http://ue.eu.int). 
 The negotiations began in September 1998 (Towards a new long-term 
partnership agreement, http://www.europa.eu.int). The EU had some proposals based 
on these issues: The need to strengthen the political dimension of the ACP-EU 
relations, a larger focus on eradicating poverty, arrangements that will stimulate trade 
and investment, changing the financial cooperation and finally, differentiation as a 
principle of a new agreement (ibid). There were four negotiation groups: The Central 
Group dealt with political and institutional issues in addition to coordination, group 2 
handled issues like private sector, investments and other development strategies 
(Ofoegbu, 1999). Group 3 dealt with issues such as economic and trade cooperation 
and finally, group 4 was responsible for financial cooperation (ibid). During the 
negotiations there were disagreements between the parties on issues such as good 
governance, the definition of the non-execution clause and the future trade regime 
(ibid). Trade-related issues were the biggest challenge in the negotiations (ibid).  
 The negotiations were completed in February 2000 (Morrissey, 2000). 
Originally, the new partnership agreement was to be signed in Fiji (ibid), but was 
eventually signed in Cotonou in Benin (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000). Its full name 
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is Partnership Agreement Between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one Part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou, Benin on 23 June 2000 (ibid).  
 
4.9.3 The Cotonou Agreement8 
Already in Article 1 the purpose of the agreement is declared: The central objective of 
the Cotonou Agreement is to further the economic, cultural and social development of 
the ACP states; it shall contribute to peace and security, and contribute to creating 
stability and a political environment based on democratic values (the Cotonou 
Agreement, 2000: Art. 1). Compared to the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, which 
focused mainly on trade and aid, the Cotonou Agreement has a rather strong political 
dimension, with a particular focus on policy dialogue (ibid: Art. 8). The Cotonou 
Agreement covers a wide range of issues, like migration, tourism, youth issues, 
cultural development, gender issues, environment and natural resources, fishery, food 
security, humanitarian and emergency assistance, to list some of them (ibid: Art. 13, 
24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 53, 54 and 72). I will not go into further details about these issues.  
 In the Cotonou Agreement there is a large focus on reducing and eradicating 
poverty and at the same time the parties declare that development must be sustainable 
(ibid: Art. 1). Another important objective of the agreement is to integrate the ACP 
countries into the world economy (ibid: Art. 1).  
 In Article 2 the fundamental principles of the Agreement are presented: First, it 
is stated that the partners are equal; second, they make it clear that the ACP states 
themselves shall define or formulate the strategies for their own development; and 
third, the central governments are the main partners, but other kinds of actors are 
invited to take part in the project of development (ibid: Art. 2). Other important 
principles of the agreement are dialogue, mutual obligations and differentiation and 
regionalisation (ibid: Art. 2). 
                                            
8 In this part I will refer to the articles or titles in the Cotonou Agreement. 
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 Article 4 underlines what is mentioned above, the ACP ownership of the 
development strategies. It states that the ACP states are supposed to establish the 
cooperation programmes together with the EU (ibid: Art. 4). Here, the role of non-state 
actors is emphasised: Non-state actors have, according to the agreement the right to be 
informed and involved in consultation and implementation of projects and 
programmes; and receive financial as well as capacity-building support (ibid: Art. 4). 
Non-state actors are the private sector, economic and social partners and civil society 
(ibid: Art. 6). 
 The political dimension is strengthened in the Cotonou Agreement. The parties 
are supposed to have a political dialogue, in which issues like arms trade, extreme 
military expenditure, drugs and organised crime and ethnic, religious and racial 
discrimination will be discussed, in addition to an “assessment of the developments 
concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law and good governance” (the 
Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 8). Promotion of peace and prevention of violent 
conflicts will have a central role in the dialogue (ibid: Art. 8). The Cotonou Agreement 
pays much attention to peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution: The 
parties have committed themselves to a policy of peace building and conflict 
prevention and resolution, with support for mediation, negotiation and work for 
reconciliation (ibid: Art. 11). 
 There is a large focus on sustainable development in the Cotonou Agreement 
(ibid: Art. 9). The human person is in focus and in this context human rights is 
important: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which also means 
respect for fundamental social rights, democracy, the rule of law and transparent and 
accountable governance are underlined in Article 9 (ibid: Art. 9).  
 As with the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement 
establishes an institutional structure. There are three institutions: The Council of 
Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (ibid: 
Art. 14). The Council of Ministers are composed of members both from the Council of 
the European Union and the European Commission and of member of the government 
of each ACP state (ibid: Art. 15). The Council of Ministers are responsible for the 
political dialogue and approves the policy guidelines (ibid: Art. 15). The Committee of 
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Ambassadors assists the Council of Ministers in carrying out its tasks and it also 
monitors the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, in addition to examining 
whether the objectives of the Agreement have been achieved (ibid: 16). This body 
consists of permanent representatives of each member state to the EU and a 
representative of the European Commission and the head of mission of each ACP state 
to the EU (ibid: Art. 16). The Joint Parliamentary Assembly has an equal number of 
EU and ACP representatives; it consists of members of the European Parliament and 
members of parliament or representatives appointed by the parliament of each ACP 
state (ibid: Art. 17). Its role is mainly consultative, and by using means such as 
dialogue and consultation this Assembly it promotes democracy (ibid: Art. 17). 
 According to the Cotonou Agreement the cooperation strategies are “based on 
development strategies and economic and trade cooperation which are interlinked and 
complementary” (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 18). As I have mentioned above, 
the development strategies are to be defined by the ACP states themselves. In the field 
of economic development the objective is to create good conditions for private 
investment, and to create a private sector, which is both “dynamic” and “competitive” 
(the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 21). Financial services to private enterprises are 
also to be improved (ibid: Art. 21). Macroeconomic and structural reforms and policies 
are given attention here as well (ibid: Art. 22). 
 In the Cotonou Agreement there is one section about social and human 
development. Cooperation in this field aims to improve the social infrastructure in the 
ACP states, which includes improving health systems, promoting the fight against 
HIV/AIDS and increasing water security (ibid: Art. 25). 
 There is also a section on regional cooperation and integration. In this context 
the ACP states will receive assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities they have 
defined themselves, at regional and sub-regional levels (ibid: Art. 28). It aims to 
integrate the ACP states into the world economy and to “accelerate economic 
cooperation and development both within and between the regions of the ACP states” 
(the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 28). Support will be given to development of and 
strengthening of regional integration institutions and organisations that are founded by 
the ACP States (ibid: Art. 29).  
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 The Cotonou Agreement has a focus on institutional development and capacity 
building. Cooperation shall contribute to the development of and strengthening of 
structures, institutions and procedures (ibid: Art. 33). This will be done in order “to 
promote and sustain” democracy, human rights, the rule of law and transparent and 
accountable governance and administration (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: 33). In 
this context the parties have committed themselves to fight against bribery and 
corruption (ibid: 33). Civil service in the ACP countries shall be reformed and 
modernised (ibid: Art. 33).  
  The objective of economic and trade cooperation is to integrate the ACP states 
into the world economy; the ACP states shall be able “to play a full part in 
international trade” (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 34). The economic and trade 
cooperation between the EU and ACP is supposed to be a strategic partnership (ibid: 
Art. 35). A central part of the Cotonou Agreement is the objective of negotiating 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs); negotiations for these agreements began in 
September 2002 and they are supposed to end in December 2007 (ibid: Art. 37). They 
shall enter into force by 1 January 2008 (ibid: Art. 37). In this context the parties have 
agreed that all trading agreements shall be World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
compatible (ibid: Art. 36).  
 Quite a lot of attention is being paid to development finance cooperation. The 
purpose of this cooperation is to help the ACP countries in achieving their objectives 
(ibid: Art. 55). The ACP states have been given quite a lot of responsibility here: They 
are responsible for formulating objectives and priorities, selecting and implementing 
and maintaining projects and programmes (ibid: Art. 57). Aid is given not only to ACP 
states, but to regional or inter-state bodies or joint bodies established by ACP and the 
EU (ibid: Art. 58). Further, it is recognised that the ACP states still have a debt 
problem. In order to help the ACP states the parties agreed to grant resources to debt 
relief initiatives (ibid: Art. 66). Structural adjustment is also dealt with in the 
agreement. Support will be given for macroeconomic and sectoral reforms that are 
implemented by the ACP states (ibid: Art. 67). As in the Lomé Convention, the parties 
acknowledge the problems of instability in export earnings (ibid: Art. 68). The system 
of STABEX was not continued in the Cotonou Agreement. However, a system of 
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additional support is established in order to cope with the problems caused by 
fluctuations in export income (ibid: Art. 68).  
 There is a whole chapter devoted to support for sectoral policies. Support will 
be given to social and economic sectoral policies and reforms, measures to increase 
productive sector activity and export competitiveness and “measures to expand social 
sector services” (the Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 69). Support will be given in 
different ways, such as sectoral programmes, budgetary support, investments, 
technical assistance and institutional support (ibid: Art. 69). 
 Decentralised cooperation is an important principle in the development policy 
of the EU and a whole chapter in the Cotonou Agreement deals with this issue. 
Support will therefore be given to microprojects at local level and decentralised 
cooperation (ibid: Art. 70).  
 Investment and private sector development support is also dealt with in the 
agreement. Investment promotion is given special attention (ibid: Art. 75). Support 
shall be given to the policies and strategies for investment and private sector 
development (ibid: 74). Support will be given as financial and technical assistance 
(ibid: Art. 74). Long-term financial resources will be provided as a help to promote 
growth in the private sector (ibid: Art. 76).  
 A central part of the Cotonou Agreement is technical cooperation. This kind of 
cooperation is meant as a help to develop manpower resources and institutions that are 
important for development to succeed (ibid: Art. 79). It also includes strengthening 
consulting firms and organisations in the ACP States and exchange arrangements in 
which consultants from the EU and the ACP States participate (ibid: Art. 79). 
 Many of the ACP states are among the least developed countries in the world, 
while others are landlocked states or island states; the Cotonou Agreement has some 
general provisions for these countries: The least developed countries will receive 
special treatment in development cooperation (ibid: Art. 84). Land-locked and island 
countries are particularly vulnerable, which must be taken into consideration in 
development cooperation (ibid: Art. 84), due to geographical positions and natural 
obstacles (ibid: Art. 87; 89). 
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4.9.4 Economic Partnership Agreements 
On 27 September 2002 the negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) between the EU and the ACP opened, with the trade Ministers from EU 
Member States and the ACP states present (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. EU opens trade 
negotiations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Press Release, Brussels, 27 
September 2002, http://www.europa.eu.int). The EU Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy said this: 
“These negotiations open a new chapter in our economic relations with the ACP. The EU and 
the ACP will work together to integrate poor countries better into the global economy and to 
fight poverty through trade and economic co-operation. To make good progress in achieving 
this goal, we should sit down and work together in a spirit of partnership from day one of the 
negotiations.” (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. EU opens trade negotiations with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries. Press Release, Brussels, 27 September 2002, 
http://www.europa.eu.int) 
The EPAs have four pillars: First, they are partnership agreements, in which both 
parties have rights and obligations (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. Negotiation of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): a means of gradually integrating the ACP 
countries into the global economy, http://www.europa.eu.int). Second, regional 
integration is central to the EPA: EPAs are based on regional integration projects 
within the ACP Group (ibid). Third, EPAs are supposed to contribute to the 
development of the ACP Group (ibid). Finally, they are linked to WTO; the EPAs will 
be in accordance with WTO rules (ibid). The EPAs are not supposed to become 
classical free trade agreements; rather, they are supposed to “maximise the 
development potential of ACP economies” (Economic Partnership Agreements: 
putting a rigorous priority on development. Press Release, Brussels, 20 January 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int). 
 The EPAs are being negotiated with regions within the ACP, not with 
individual countries (ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements (14). Maastricht: ECDPM).9 However, the 39 least developed countries 
                                            
9 See appendix for a list of the regions. 
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are given special treatment, which means that they do not have to sign an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (ibid). Central Africa was the first region to start negotiations, 
which opened in October 2003 (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. Regional negotiations of 
Economic Partnership Agreements, http://www.europa.eu.int). They were quickly 
followed by West Africa, which started their negotiations just a couple of days later 
(ibid). Eastern and Southern Africa started negotiating in February 2004 (ibid). In 
April 2004 the Caribbean states launched their negotiations (ibid). In July the same 
year, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) started negotiating their 
EPA (ibid). Finally, in September 2004 the EPA negotiations with the Pacific started 
(ibid).    
 The Economic Partnership Agreements are controversial. In September 2004 
several NGOs started a “Stop-EPA” campaign, in which the critics argue that these 
agreements “make grossly unfair demands on ACP countries, will bring trade-related 
issues, which were abolished from WTO talks, in through the backdoor and will harm 
the poor through reducing ACP fiscal revenue” (Economic Partnership Agreements: 
putting a rigorous priority on development. Press Release, Brussels, 20 January 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int).  
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5 ANALYSIS PART 1: THE INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
5.1 Introduction 
Which interests were decisive for the EU in the process which led to the Cotonou 
Agreement? This is the main question in the analysis in this chapter. In this chapter the 
theoretical framework outlined in the theoretical chapter will be used as analytical 
tools. There will be a focus on self-interests, in terms of security interests and 
economic interests, and value-based interests, as well as other interests. 
 First, there will be a short discussion on the process which led to the Cotonou 
Agreement. Then I will present the analysis, which is divided into three parts. The first 
part of the analysis deals with self-interests (security and economic interests). The 
second part deals with the value-based interests. The last part deals with other types of 
interests which cannot be classified like the other interests. In this chapter the use of 
quotations is a central part of the analysis. 
 
5.2 The process 
The Green Paper was the start of the process which eventually led to the signing of the 
Cotonou Agreement and in the Green Paper the EU reviews the previous conventions, 
Yaoundé and Lomé. The EU is not satisfied with the results, which have been mixed 
and in many cases unsuccessful (European Commission, 1996: 11). For example, the 
EU admits that the Lomé Convention was not very realistic (ibid: 12). And the 
partnership was not “fully realised” (ibid: 12). 
“This new international environment has prompted the European Union to redefine its political 
and security interests…” (European Commission, 1996: i) 
This quotation indicates that the interests of the EU are changing, which also has to 
affect the development policy of the Union and its relations with the ACP countries. 
Not only had the results of previous conventions been mixed, but in the years after the 
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Cold War the international situation changed. This new international situation was 
characterised by increasing globalisation (European Commission, 1996: 1). And an 
important driving force was the eagerness of achieving the results that lacked after 
Yaoundé and Lomé (ibid: 18). 
 
5.3 Self-interests 
In this part I will start with the economic interest and then go on to look at security 
interests.  
“The European Union’s primary concern must be the integration of the poor into the economic 
and social life and the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.” (European 
Commission, 1996: Foreword) 
“The EU’s efforts to reduce poverty and inequalities in development around the world are also 
closely linked to the quest for peace and stability, the need for better management of global 
interdependence and risks, and promotion of a kind of world development that is more 
compatible with European political and social values.” (European Commission, 1996: iii)  
These two quotations have to be commented upon. Together they sum up EU’s 
declared objectives and interests, which I will discuss in detail below. The first one 
emphasises the economic objectives and also social objectives. The second quotation 
also mentions social objectives, but it focuses on security interests in particular and it 
shows that value-based interests are of great importance to the EU. 
 
5.3.1 Economic interests 
Trade and integration into the world economy 
Economic interests have certainly played an important role for the EU in the process 
which led to the Cotonou Agreement, as trade and economic partnership are central 
elements of the Cotonou Agreement. Another important factor for the EU was the 
increasing multilateral and regional trade liberalisation; it was necessary to follow 
WTO rules (European Commission, 1996: 19). In the Green Paper the EU emphasises 
the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy (ibid: Foreword). The 
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ambition of integrating these countries into the world economy is also underlined in 
the guidelines for the negotiations: Developing their trading capacities and making 
them more interesting for investors are important aspects of that (European 
Commission, 1997: 22). 
 The EU believes that:  
 
“In practice, European producers will benefit in the medium or long-term from increased 
prosperity in partner countries with fast-growing populations.” (European Commission, 1996: 
4)                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
The EU clearly has an interest in more prosperity in the developing countries, as it 
gives them new opportunities for investments, for instance. 
 There is a strong focus on developing an economic partnership between the EU 
and the ACP countries. The EU and the ACP countries are negotiating Economic 
Partnership Agreements.10 In the negotiation guidelines the EU makes it clear that they 
want to abandon the system of unilateral preferences; instead, the EU wants to 
introduce “a more balanced approach characterised by a genuine partnership and                                                                                                                                                                                     
taking account of the parties’ mutual interests” (European Commission, 1997: 22). The 
objectives of the EU are quite ambitious, not only on behalf of the ACP countries, but 
also on behalf of itself: As mentioned before, the EU is strongly in favour of 
integrating the ACP countries into the world economy. Perhaps more interesting is the 
objective to strengthen Europe’s presence in the ACP countries “by enabling EU 
businesses to tap into those countries’ comparative advantages” (European 
Commission, 1997: 22). This is an example which shows that economic self-interests 
definitely are important to the EU.                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Non-reciprocity was a principle of the Lomé Convention.11 However, the EU 
wanted to abandon that principle in the new convention and the EU was strongly in 
favour of incorporating reciprocity in trade as a step toward liberalisation (ibid: 25). 
This is underlined with this quotation from the guidelines for the negotiations:  
                                            
10 See chapter 4. 
11 See chapter 4. 
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“Regionalised economic cooperation agreements would consolidate the ACP countries’ access 
to the European market and introduce an element of reciprocity for EU exports.” (European    
Commission, 1997: 25) 
 
Here, the EU shows that it is interested in the ACP markets; it wants to sell its 
products on the ACP markets. 
 And at the first ministerial conference the ministers managed to agree on the 
abandonment of the non-reciprocal trade preferences (European Commission, 1999b: 
1). 
“The cooperation framework must henceforth do more to help the ACP States to open their 
markets to develop trade with the EU, of course, but also with other partners.” (European 
Commission, 1996: 41) 
 
As the quotation above shows, the EU clearly wants the ACP countries to open their 
markets for EU products. The EU regards these countries as potential and important 
markets for their products. These countries have been and still are important for the 
EU because they produce and export raw materials that the EU countries are 
dependent upon.12 The guidelines for the negotiations have a strong focus on common 
or mutual interests: The economic cooperation or partnership should be advantageous 
for both parties and mutual interest is seen as a driving force for cooperation 
economically, as well as socially and environmentally (European Commission, 1997: 
15). Mutual interests or common interests are frequently used terms, which we will see 
below. The use of such terms might be an attempt by the EU to present its motives or 
interests in a more positive light. The term self-interest is hardly mentioned at all, 
though it is clear self-interests, which means economic benefits are of high importance 
to the EU. The focus on common interests is underlined in this quotation from the 
guidelines for the negotiations: 
 
“The EU and the ACP countries have common interests to defend.” (European Commission, 
1997: 9) 
                                            
12 See chapter 4. 
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Further, the EU argues that the relations with the ACP States must “foster mutually-
advantageous economic development” (European Commission, 1997: 9). 
 
 
Disagreements 
During the negotiations the parties managed to agree easily on a number of issues, 
while other issues were more difficult. In this case it is of greater interest to see what 
the parties disagreed on. During negotiations the interests of the parties become 
clearer. The negotiation memos were important sources in this case. However, they do 
not give many details, or opinions from the EU’s point of view, and they were written 
as reports. 
 Economic issues were difficult. The most difficult issues were about market 
access and transitional period, debt, financial cooperation etc. During the negotiations 
the parties agreed on a transitional period, but they had different opinions on how long 
this period should last (European Commission, 1998a: 4). The ACP countries wanted a 
10-year transitional period in order to prepare themselves to the new economic 
partnership agreements with the EU, while the EU on the other hand proposed a 
transitional period for five years (European Commission, 1998b: 1-2). At one point the 
ACP countries asked for improved market access during the preparatory period, but 
the EU was not willing to do so (European Commission, 1999c: 2).  
 In the Green Paper the EU clearly is in favour of revising the financial and 
technical cooperation and the main reasons for that are the fact that the partnership to a 
greater extent will be based on reciprocity and the introduction of “a more explicit 
allocation of the partners’ responsibilities;” the fact that Community assistance must 
be changed due to some variation in level of development between the ACP countries 
and “the need to reconcile the predictability of accumulated aid practice with the 
requirement for better-tailored and more efficient aid” (European Commission, 1996: 
70). Further, some options are discussed: The first option is to maintain the current 
divisions of allocations, but the EU is rather sceptical to this option, as this alternative 
has too many disadvantages (ibid: 71). The second option is to organise all aid 
operations by having one source of funds (ibid: 71). The EU appears to be more 
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positive to this alternative, as it argues that the organisation will be more flexible and 
provides “subsequent development of financial assistance” (European Commission, 
1996: 71). The last alternative is to create two or three separate allocations: There will 
be one fund for long-term assistance for the public sector; a second fund reserved for 
emergencies and it might be necessary with a third fund, which will be reserved for 
direct assistance to non-governmental actors, private sector, associations, consumer 
organisations and NGOs (ibid: 71). The EU is clearly most enthusiastic about this 
alternative, as they argue that Community aid policy will be “more flexible, cohesive 
and transparent” (European Commission, 1996: 71). 
 Also in the negotiation guidelines the EU states that the procedures for 
managing financial and technical cooperation need a radical change; this is explained 
by pointing to demands for more efficiency in financial management and 
differentiation is considered necessary (European Commission, 1997: 4). Cooperation 
instruments have to be simplified and rationalised, according to the EU (ibid: 5). The 
EU focuses particularly on reducing the number of instruments, which should be done 
by having three separate packages and by giving programming an important role in 
cooperation (ibid: 28). According to the guidelines for the negotiations there would be 
one package of programmable resources reserved for long-term development, an 
investment fund which would be used to support the development of the private sector 
and trade, for example and finally a package reserved for emergencies (ibid: 28). This 
focus must be regarded as an answer to the criticism towards the Lomé Convention of 
the large number of instruments which had been set up over the years:  
 
“Cooperation with the ACP countries is now overburdened with instruments which are 
tailored to predetermined uses and are increasingly difficult to run in a coherent way.” 
(European Commission, 1996: 70) 
  
The EU argued that the instruments for financial cooperation were too complex, 
inflexible and that there was little or no transparency and argued in favour of 
rationalising and simplifying the instruments, a point which was emphasised in the 
guidelines for the negotiations (European Commission, 1997: 27).  
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  The ACP argued against such a rationalising; they wanted to maintain the 
number of instruments, but were positive to improving and simplifying the instruments 
and procedures so that the aid becomes more efficient (European Commission, 1998b: 
2).  
 An important question being asked in the Green Paper is whether aid should be 
granted according to need or according to merit. Traditionally, aid has been granted 
according to needs, human development indicators, the country’s size and 
geographical position (island or landlocked countries) (European Commission, 1996: 
71). With the mid-term review of Lomé IV a new system of allocation was introduced: 
Parts of the resources were granted according to performance in sectoral policy (ibid: 
72). The EU argues in favour of such a system (ibid: 72). Further, the EU argues in 
favour of a new concept, called “good management” (European Commission, 1996: 
72). This means that aid will be granted according to social and economic indicators 
and poverty levels and according to political and economic criteria (ibid: 72). A 
consequence of this system will be to introduce ongoing programming for three, four 
or five years with annual reviews, for instance (ibid: 73). 
 Also in the guidelines for the negotiations the EU argues for a new system of 
programming, in which aid is granted according to needs and merit (European 
Commission, 1997: 29). The EU presented its proposal to the ACP countries in the 
negotiations: The EU wanted to introduce a system of rolling programming, which 
means that resources to the ACP countries no longer would be allocated on the basis of 
need only (European Commission, 1999a: 2). Resources would be granted according 
to need and performance; the parties would have to agree on the performance criteria 
(ibid: 2). The ACP countries were sceptical to this new system, particularly to the 
performance assessment mechanism (European Commission, 1998a: 4). They might 
have feared that they would receive fewer resources after the introduction of such a 
system. It is likely that they would prefer the continuation of the old system, with 
resources being allocated on the basis of need. 
 Both the EU and the ACP agreed on the importance of developing the private 
sector and the importance of investment (European Commission, 1998a: 3). The latter 
issue was a difficult one in the negotiations. More precisely, the parties had different 
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opinions on investment guarantees; the most difficult questions were about the 
coverage of risks and on the establishment of an investment guarantee agency, because 
there was already a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement (European 
Commission, 1999e: 3) The EU was most likely sceptical to establishing of an 
investment guarantee agency, due to the existing agreement. A new agency would be 
expensive and not very effective, according to the EU (ibid: 3). 
 In the negotiations the EU and the ACP agreed on establishing an Investment 
Facility (European Commission, 1999b: 2). However, this issue was not an easy one in 
the negotiations, especially the issue of concessionality for loans under the Investment 
Facility was difficult: The EU argued that loans under this Investment Facility in 
general should be given on market terms (European Commission, 1999e: 7). To the 
ACP countries, on the other hand, this did not represent a development but rather the 
opposite (ibid: 7). This led the ACP countries to ask how the Investment Facility could 
be useful if the EU insists on loans given on market terms (ibid: 7).  
 Debt relief was another difficult issue in the negotiations between the EU and 
the ACP states. The ACP states asked the EU to cancel all debt from the European 
Development Fund (EDF) all ACP countries owed; the EU, on the other hand, would 
rather contribute to international initiatives to reduce the debt of the developing 
countries (European Commission, 1999e: 7). Eventually, the parties managed to agree 
on the debt issue and the negotiators agreed on this: € 1 billion would be given to the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; the EDF structural adjustment 
facility would be increased with € 250 million and in addition the parties agreed on 
conditions for debt relief for the ACP States (European Commission, 1999f: 2). 
 Here we have seen that the EU wanted many changes in the economic field. 
The EU wants more flexibility and transparency, which means that the EU wants more 
control with the use of resources. The EU also wants more simplicity rather than 
complexity. Efficiency is also important to the EU. But more important, the EU is 
clearly unwilling to use more resources than necessary. It demonstrates an 
unwillingness to grant aid to those countries that do not perform as expected or to 
countries that do not need the money most. The EU clearly has a limit on how much it 
is willing to give. 
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5.3.2 Security interests 
Contrary to previous conventions, security issues have been given much more 
attention in the process and in the Cotonou Agreement itself. In other words, security 
issues have become more important in the relations between the EU and the ACP 
states than before, mainly because of a new international situation; the EU considers 
peace and security as “minimum conditions for development” (European Commission, 
1996: 28). In the negotiation guidelines it is stressed that the relations between the EU 
and the ACP “must become a factor for peace and stability” (European Commission, 
1997: 9). The EU also considers itself as a “force for stability” which can have a great 
deal of impact in the field of security in developing countries (European Commission, 
1996: 6). The EU makes it clear that development cooperation has to fulfil the 
objectives of the common foreign and security policy, which means that development 
cooperation “must preserve peace and strengthen international security” (European 
Commission, 1997: 11). Further, it should deal with the causes of poverty and 
inequality, which may be a source of conflict (ibid: 11). However, despite this new and 
stronger focus on security issues, they do still receive less attention than economic 
issues, for instance. 
 
New security situation 
In chapter 2 I wrote about the new concept of security that has been developed in 
recent years: The concept of security has been extended. During the Cold War security 
was linked to military force. Threats against national states were mainly military and 
came from other states. In addition to military security, other issues have been 
“securitised”. This means new terms have been developed, such as political security, 
economic security, societal security and environmental security. The new threats also 
require other solutions than the traditional military alliances, such as legally binding 
agreements. 
 The new thinking on security has also affected the EU. The EU considers these 
issues to be the main threats today: Armed conflicts, proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
terrorism and migration (European Commission, 1996: 4). 
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 Many ACP countries have been and are still characterised by civil war and lack 
of political stability and low degree of social stability (European Commission, 1996: 
28). In the Green Paper it is clearly stated that it is in the interest of the EU to promote 
“peace and stability, by preventing the development or persistence of areas of 
instability in the world” and “more effective international cooperation to manage 
global threats” (European Commission, 1996: 38). The EU pays attention to the threat 
of marginalisation of communities and countries being destabilised or disintegrated, 
which have to be prevented; another objective is to develop and preserve the rule of 
law in the ACP countries and to maintain a certain level of social cohesion (ibid: 38).  
 Besides armed conflicts, there are other fields in which the EU wants to 
cooperate. Migratory pressure is an issue of great concern to the EU, because illegal 
immigration from developing countries is a problem (European Commission, 1996: 
38). This issue was being discussed in the negotiations; it was characterised as 
“difficult” and “sensitive” (European Commission, 2000: 1). But eventually the parties 
reached an agreement; the parties agreed to launch a process in which they will send 
illegal immigrants back to their own countries (ibid: 1-2). Terrorism, trafficking and 
pandemics, or global epidemics, are other issues the EU wants to cooperate on 
(European Commission, 1996: 38). In other words, these issues have become 
securitised. 
 The guidelines for the negotiations state clearly that it is necessary with 
cooperation in order to improve both global and regional security; cooperation could 
deal with issues such as non-proliferation, arms control, illegal arms trafficking and 
land mines (European Commission, 1997: 12). 
 As we have seen here, the EU has given security a rather wide definition. The 
EU focuses on a wide range of issues, not only military threats, but threats like 
trafficking and migration and threats to human health. More issues have become 
securitised. Some of these issues can threaten the EU more directly than others. An 
issue like migration was quite difficult in the negotiation, while pandemics may not be 
a threat at the moment, but it could be a threat in the future. 
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Conflict prevention 
Article 11 in the Cotonou Agreement says: 
“1. The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building 
and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the Partnership. This policy 
shall be based on the principle of ownership. It shall in particular focus on building regional, 
sub-regional and national capacities, and on preventing violent conflicts at an early stage by 
addressing their root-causes in a targeted manner, and with an adequate combination of all 
available instruments.” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000: Art. 11) 
As mentioned above, risk of armed conflict is one of the main security concerns of the 
EU. And civil wars have been a problem in many ACP countries, with a large number 
of casualties (European Commission, 1996: 28). Further, there has been an increase in 
organised violence and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 
1996: 40). This has led to a much larger focus on conflict prevention in the process 
which led to the Cotonou Agreement and in the agreement itself, as the quotation from 
the Cotonou Agreement above shows. In the Green Paper, the European Commission 
proposed to establish a European conflict prevention and settlement policy, or more 
precisely a “comprehensive strategy,” with the possibility of “coordinated 
intervention,” in order to achieve “structural stability,” which means achieving 
“sustainable economic and social development,” democracy, human rights, political 
structures that function properly and capacity to handle changes without the use of 
violence (European Commission, 1996: 40). As the quotation from the Cotonou 
Agreement above shows, there is a particular focus on preventing conflicts as early as 
possible and targeting the roots of the conflicts. 
 The focus on conflict prevention is emphasised in the guidelines for the 
negotiations: In 1997 the EU approved guidelines on conflict prevention in Africa 
(European Commission, 1997: 11). In the guidelines for the negotiations the EU points 
out that preventing and settling conflicts will be an important issue in the so-called 
policy dialogue, together with issues such as arms control and land mines (ibid: 13-
14). 
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5.4 Value-based interests 
In the Green Paper the EU makes it clear that it wants “a world development that is 
more compatible with European political and social values” (European Commission, 
1996: iii, see quotation earlier in this chapter). In other words, the EU wants the rest of 
the world to become more like Europe. The EU pays attention to different aspects of 
development, or important values: The political aspect (democracy, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, rule of law), the social aspect (living conditions, preventing 
disintegration of the basic structure of society) and the environmental aspect 
(“conflicts and food deficits due to water shortages and soil degradation”) (European 
Commission, 1996: 4). I have chosen to focus on the political and social aspects here. 
 
5.4.1 Democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance 
The EU believes it can contribute to institutional development (European Commission, 
1996: xii). In the Green Paper the EU states that there are “compelling reasons for the 
EU” to play a more active role in institutional development (European Commission, 
1996: 63). This issue should be given higher priority and become an important part of 
the relations with the ACP States (ibid: 63). The EU believes this would force the ACP 
States to reflect on how their political systems are organised and how to improve these 
systems (ibid: 63). The EU believes more emphasis on institutional development will 
have a positive impact on Community aid; it will be improved (ibid: 63). Respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the application of democratic principles 
are regarded as “essential” by the EU (ibid: 63) and that was also emphasised in the 
guidelines for the negotiations:  
“Human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are now an essential element of EU-
ACP relations.” (European Commission, 1997: 12) 
In the negotiations the parties agreed to find a definition of “essential elements” and 
from the EU’s point of view the essential elements are respect for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance (European Commission, 1998a: 2). 
 The guidelines for the negotiations stress the importance of good governance to 
social development and reducing poverty, increasing investment and developing the 
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private sector (European Commission, 1997: 13). The question of whether good 
governance should be one of the essential elements was a difficult one in the 
negotiations: The ACP countries argued that good governance was not well-defined, 
which could lead to “arbitrary decisions” (European Commission, 1999b: 1). The EU 
stressed that there should be no doubt about the commitments of both parties, when it 
comes to transparency and accountability in how public resources are managed 
(European Commission, 1999d: 1). However, the parties managed to reach an 
agreement on the definition of good governance: Good governance was defined “in the 
context of a political and institutional environment that upheld human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law, as the transparent and responsible 
management of public resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable 
development” (European Commission, 1999f: 1). Good governance is a “fundamental 
element” of the agreement (ibid: 1). Note the use of the word “fundamental”, not 
“essential”, as the EU originally proposed (see above). 
 
5.4.2 Solidarity 
According to the EU, it has an interest in promoting solidarity and in the Green Paper 
the EU argues that cooperation across national borders is necessary in order to fight 
against absolute poverty and for respect for democracy and human rights (European 
Commission, 1996: 38). The Commissioner for Development Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielsen said this before the signing of the Cotonou 
Agreement: 
“I am both proud and honoured to sign this agreement. It is forged from a common will to 
approach the future through global partnership. It demonstrates the European Union’s 
commitment to pursue its work in the world by promoting the values of solidarity and 
dialogue.” (The European Community and its Member States sign a new Partnership 
Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states in Cotonou, Benin. Brussels, 21 
June 2000, http://www.europa.eu.int) 
The importance of solidarity was also underlined in the speech of the President of the 
Council at the signing ceremony of the agreement; he declared that solidarity is among 
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the fundamental principles of the relations between the EU and the ACP states 
(DRAFT SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AT THE SIGNING 
CEREMONY FOR THE ACP-EC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (COTONOU, 
BENIN, 23 JUNE 2000), http://ue.eu.int).  
 
5.4.3 The social and economic dimension: Poverty alleviation 
“Improving living and working conditions in the developing countries is now a priority for the 
Union’s action abroad. The Union is not seeking to export its model; it is simply sharing its 
experience.” (European Commission, 1997: 15) 
“It is very much in the European Union’s interest to encourage a form of development (i) 
guaranteeing social progress, respect for human rights and above all fundamental social rights; 
and (ii) focusing on the problems of destruction of the environment and natural resources” 
(European Commission, 1996: 38). 
The Green Paper pays a lot of attention to the social and economic dimension. There is 
a strong focus on improving living and working conditions in the developing 
countries, as the first quotation above shows. Notable in the first of these two 
quotations is the claim that the EU just wants to share its experience, not to impose its 
model on other countries. The second quotation has a strong focus on social progress 
and fundamental social rights, besides human rights. It also shows that there was a 
focus on environmental problems in the process. 
 There is a strong focus on alleviating poverty. In the Green Paper, the EU 
argues that poverty reduction should be the focus for cooperation between the EU and 
ACP countries (European Commission, 1996: xi). According to the guidelines for the 
negotiations, the EU wants poverty reduction to be “the cornerstone of the new 
partnership” (European Commission, 1997: 4). Poverty alleviation will be placed in an 
“integrated approach” dealing with both the causes of economic growth and the social 
effects of such growth (ibid: 16).   
 However, the focus on poverty alleviation is not new in the EU’s policies. In 
1993 the EU passed a resolution on poverty reduction (European Commission, 1996: 
59). The Green Paper focuses on different factors of the poverty issue, such as the role 
of women, health care, primary education and training, food aid and food security aid 
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and preservation of the environment (ibid: 59). The EU underlines the necessity of 
having a broad approach and could have a strategic approach to its partners in two 
areas: Access to productive resources, employment and human resource development 
and support for social policies (ibid: 60).  
 The negotiation guidelines also call for a stronger social dimension in the 
cooperation between the EU and the ACP States (European Commission, 1997: 10). 
The EU will support the ACP States in maintaining and increasing funding for the 
largest social sectors and establishing social services and systems that protects against 
changes in economic conditions, local needs and the specific demands of a country or 
region (ibid: 18). 
 
5.5 Other interests 
So far I have been looking at self-interests (security and economic interests) and value-
based interests, which had to do with democracy, human rights, solidarity and poverty 
alleviation. But there are other interests that is difficult to classify as economic, 
security or value-based. However, they may be classified as self-interests, but I have 
chosen to deal with them separately. 
“In a world now multipolar, the Union must make its presence felt in all regions of the world.” 
(European Commission, 1996: foreword) 
This quotation shows the ambition of the EU to become a global actor. It is clear that 
the EU wants to establish itself as a global actor in the international system, with a 
global common foreign and security policy. The EU is not only involved in the ACP 
countries, but also in other parts of the world. 
 Other interests deal more with prestige and reputation, and more indirectly with 
the other interests discussed above. The EU is certainly concerned with its identity and 
image around the world: 
 
“We are dealing in these negotiations with an important aspect of the EU’s identity abroad.” 
(Towards a new long-term partnership agreement, http://www.europa.eu.int) 
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 In an interview with Kenneth Karl in the ACP-EU courier, Bernard Petit, who 
is a director in the European Commission, said this: 
“…EU’s development policy conveys a certain image of Europe in the world, based on 
common values of solidarity, social progress and democracy.” (Karl, 2000b) 
The first quotation clearly shows that the development policy is an important part of 
the EU’s identity in the rest of the world. The last quotation shows how the EU wants 
to be perceived in the rest of the world: as an actor promoting democracy and 
solidarity. 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have been looking at different types of interests: Economic, security 
and value-based interests. Economic interests have been very important for the EU in 
the process which led to the Cotonou Agreement. Economic issues were the most 
difficult questions in the negotiations. Security issues have been given more attention 
this time than earlier. There is a strong focus on conflict prevention and settlement. 
Promotion of values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and solidarity is 
being underlined. As we have seen, the political dimension has been given more 
attention in the process which led to the Cotonou Agreement and in the agreement 
itself than in previous conventions. Poverty reduction is the “cornerstone” of this 
agreement (European Commission, 1997: 4).  
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6 ANALYSIS PART 2: PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The second part of the analysis deals with a different aspect of the research question, 
path dependence. Path dependence will be the theoretical framework in this part of the 
analysis. To recapitulate a little bit, path dependence is used to describe political 
processes. Path dependence means that earlier events will affect possible outcomes of 
events happening in the future. For actors who have launched a certain policy, 
reversing that policy can be very costly.  
 The main purpose of this chapter is to find out whether the EU had any choice 
but to continue the relations with the ACP countries. An important question in this 
chapter would be: Was the feeling of duty toward the ACP countries so strong in this 
case? Another important question is: Was it important for the EU to maintain certain 
principles from the Lomé Convention? I will use various quotations in order to answer 
these questions. I will also discuss whether the relations between the EU and the ACP 
countries are an example of a process of increasing returns. In this chapter I will focus 
on the Green Paper and different alternatives outlined in that document. Then I will 
look at the choice the EU made in this context and the will to continue. Attention will 
be paid to the need for changes, the wish to preserve a culture, ambitions and 
challenges. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
6.2 The Green Paper: the options 
As we have seen in a previous chapter, the Green Paper discusses the future of the 
relations between the EU and the ACP states. An important question is whether these 
relations should be maintained or not and if they are maintained, should the relations 
be extended? (European Commission, 1996: 43) Several alternatives are discussed: 
The options vary from maintaining status quo to having a global agreement plus 
bilateral agreements, from regional agreements to having an agreement with the least 
developed countries only (European Commission, 1996: 44-45). However, the EU is 
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most positive to a global agreement supplemented by bilateral agreements, as it 
“would no doubt make it possible to tailor EU operations more closely to 
circumstances” (European Commission, 1996: 44). To a large extent the EU wants to 
continue with having an overall or global agreement, but at the same time 
acknowledges that changes are necessary, as we will see below. Maintaining the 
partnership is an important principle in these relations for both parties (ibid: 65).                                                                                                                                                      
 There is also a discussion on different trade arrangements in the Green Paper: 
They vary from maintaining status quo, to integration into the GSP (Generalised 
System of Preferences), from uniform or differentiated reciprocity to differentiation 
under a single framework and differentiation leading to a variety of arrangements 
(European Commission, 1996: 65-67). Important questions asked are: In what way 
would these alternatives affect the partnership, positively or negatively? (ibid: 65) 
I will not go into further detail about every option discussed in the Green Paper. 
However, the comments given on two of the alternatives are interesting and relevant in 
this context. I will have a closer look at these two alternatives: Differentiation under a 
single framework and differentiation leading to a variety of arrangements. 
 The EU is most enthusiastic about the option differentiation under a single 
framework (see quotation below). This alternative includes the first four options: 
Status quo, integration into the GSP (Generalised System of Preferences), uniform 
reciprocity and differentiated reciprocity (ibid: 66). This depends on the development 
level, needs, the willingness of the ACP countries to develop this relationship with the 
EU, and on how much reciprocity the ACP countries are willing to concede to the EU 
(ibid: 66). The contractual character of the relations would be maintained (ibid: 66). 
This option opens for several possible trading arrangements: Region-to-Region Free 
Trade Agreements, bilateral FTAs, non-reciprocal preferences and graduation into 
GSP (ibid: 66-67). The EU says this about this option: 
 
“This framework option would preserve the integrity of the existing Lomé Convention but 
would allow for reciprocity, differentiation and graduation considerations to be added as 
additional basic dimensions of the partnership principle.” (European Commission, 1996: 67) 
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This statement demonstrates the EU’s attitude in trade issues. It both preserves the 
integrity of the Lomé Convention and gives new dimensions such as reciprocity, 
differentiation and graduation. As I wrote in the first analytical chapter, reciprocity in 
particular is important to the EU. 
 On the other hand, the EU is rather sceptical to the alternative differentiation 
leading to a variety of arrangements, which the comment below shows. With this 
system the first four alternatives, status quo, integration into the GSP, uniform 
reciprocity and differentiated reciprocity open for different trading arrangements, 
combined with a single aid package (European Commission, 1996: 67). The EU has 
this quite negative comment to this alternative: 
 
“The integrity of the Lomé Convention is obviously the first casualty of this approach.” 
(European Commission, 1996: 67) 
The EU clearly believes that this alternative will not preserve the integrity of the Lomé 
Convention. 
 Preserving the integrity of the Lomé Convention is obviously an important 
point for the EU. The EU wants to continue along the lines of the Lomé Convention, at 
least to some extent. In other words, the EU does not want a new partnership and new 
trade arrangements to be radically different from the Lomé Convention, though the EU 
does not want to maintain status quo. 
 
6.3 The choice 
As we have seen above, several alternatives were considered for a future partnership. 
The debate demonstrated a will to maintain the relations with the ACP states as one 
group (European Commission, 1997: 5). The fifth guideline for the negotiations states 
clearly that the ACP will be preserved as a group or a political entity, but at the same 
time this guideline states that “considerable geographical differentiation” will be 
introduced (European Commission, 1997: 5). The European Commission proposed to 
have an overall agreement which will be marked by differentiation, due to the 
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importance of regional integration for development, the need to adjust various aspects 
of the ACP countries (ibid: 5). 
 The EU wants to have a partnership with the ACP countries. That is a 
“tradition”: 
 
“The principle of partnership has been at the very heart of the Conventions that have bound 
the Community and the ACP countries since 1975.” (European Commission, 1996: 10) 
In fact, the EU insists in the Green Paper that partnership is the best way of 
cooperation and agreement with the ACP states. It is valuable, according to the EU: 
“The difficulties of putting “partnership” into practice should not call into question the value 
of this form mutual political commitment. The circumstances and huge challenges facing 
many ACP countries are good reason to preserve the strengths and qualities of the 
present relationship, in particular the predictability and contractual nature of the aid. But this 
political commitment must be made more explicit and more effective.” (European 
Commission, 1996: vi) 
Here, the EU admits that the partnership has faced some problems, but that should not 
prevent the parties from continuing the partnership, due to its value. Further, the EU 
points to the challenges facing the ACP countries. It is important for the EU to 
preserve the most positive aspects of the Lomé Convention. And the EU puts more 
emphasis on the political commitment. The EU is indeed very positive to maintaining 
the partnership, which the EU stresses in this statement: 
“Partnership is undoubtedly still the ideal form for cooperation relations and any future 
agreement between the EU and the ACP States must endeavour to restore it.” (European 
Commission, 1996: 39) 
According to the EU, the EU-ACP grouping has a value in a new multipolar world in 
which North-South relations have been changed (European Commission, 1997: 31). 
The EU argues that there is a need for an overall agreement, based on two principles: 
First, the EU believes it is valuable with an EU-ACP grouping in a multipolar world, a 
grouping that has potential of becoming a force or actor in the world, according to the 
EU (ibid: 31). Second, there is the principle of solidarity (ibid: 31). The EU also 
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argues that there is a need for a differentiated approach, due to the regional dimension 
of economic and trade cooperation and the fact that regional integration to a larger 
extent than before has become an important factor for development (ibid: 31).  
 The Cotonou Agreement was another step in the relations with the ACP group. 
As in previous conventions, aid and trade are important aspects of this agreement, 
though aid has gained increased importance with the Economic Partnership 
Agreements. However, the cooperation has again been extended. The Cotonou 
Agreement is certainly not an aid and trade package only. Security has become more 
important than ever before, with a strong focus on conflict prevention. There is also a 
larger focus on democracy and human rights. The political dimension has been 
strengthened. The group of actors involved was also extended. Non-governmental 
actors are supposed to play a role in the partnership between the EU and ACP. The 
Cotonou Agreement is to a large extent both an extension of the cooperation and not 
least a continuation of previous policy. 
 
 
6.4 A will to continue                                                                                                                                                                 
In an interview with Kenneth Karl in the ACP-EU Courier Bernard Petit, director in 
the European Commission said this: 
“The conclusion of this agreement shows that the will within the EU to set up a framework of 
privileged relations with the ACP Group is indeed genuine.” (Karl, 2000b) 
This statement is interesting in this context. Petit wants to show that the will to 
continue these relations are strong. 
 Below there is a number of quotations from different sources, mainly from the 
Green Paper, in addition to some speeches. The formulations are all different, but they 
do say mostly the same. 
 
6.4.1 The ambition 
“Our goal is clear, to revitalize ACP-EU relations; open new horizons and boost the chances 
of success. ACP-EU relations are still a key part of the Union’s identity. The post-colonial era 
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is coming to an end but our responsibilities towards the ACP countries continue, for deep-
rooted reasons that the Green Paper sets out to explain.” (European Commission, 1996: 
Foreword) 
Here, the EU is quite explicit and the ambition is clear: The goal is to revitalise these 
relations. The EU’s responsibilities are emphasised here. Note the use of the term 
“deep-rooted reasons.” The EU also states that it wants an extension of cooperation. 
The EU is clearly quite eager to achieve success in its development policy. It is a 
driving force for the EU. It shows that there is a strong will within the EU to take 
another step and continue the relations with the ACP countries. And note that the EU 
considers these relations as a part of its identity. 
 
6.4.2 The need for change: Challenges and new conditions 
“As the 21st century dawns, relations between the EU and the ACP countries should be put on 
new footing to take account not only of changed political and economic conditions for 
development but also of changed attitudes in Europe.” (European Commission, 1996: iv) 
“As the 21st century nears, the Union must redesign its aid policy towards the ACP countries 
from scratch, not only as a result of changes in the economic and political conditions 
governing development or rapid development in other regions of the world but because 
Europe’s motives are no longer the same.” (European Commission, 1996: 11) 
These two quotations are both taken from the Green Paper and they are quite similar. 
The main message here is that the EU has to redefine the aid policy and relations with 
the ACP group for the 21st century due to political and economic changes. Notable is 
also the claim that Europe has other motives than before. Again, the will to continue 
the relations, despite necessary changes, is demonstrated. 
“ACP-EU cooperation is a living organism. It operates in an international context that is 
radically changing. The framework and the content of our cooperation need to be constantly 
adapted to the new realities with which we are confronted.” (DRAFT SPEECH BY THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY FOR THE ACP-EC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (COTONOU, BENIN, 23 JUNE 2000), http://ue.eu.int) 
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This quotation is quite interesting, because of the use of a metaphor. Note how the 
cooperation between the ACP and the EU is characterized: “a living organism,” which 
means that it develops and changes. In other words, it is not constant. Again, changes 
internationally are underlined. This quotation also states that changes to the 
cooperation are necessary due to these changes. 
“The basic philosophy underlying ACP-EU cooperation has not essentially changed. This is to 
define, in the long term, a framework agreement of privileged relationships, founded on three 
pillars: the political dimension, trade and development aid. Past experience and the need to 
adapt the partnership to upheavals at an international level required a fundamental review of 
the spirit, objectives and implementation of our cooperation, so that we could revitalize the 
partnership and give it new aspirations and, above all, increased chance of success.” (Karl, 
2000b) 
This statement was made by Bernard Petit in the European Commission in an 
interview with Kenneth Karl in ACP-EU Courier. Petit was asked whether there has 
been a fundamental change in philosophy in relations between the EU and its partners. 
His answer is interesting and relevant in this context. He states that the basic 
philosophy for the cooperation between the EU and the ACP has not changed. Above, 
there are quotations from the Green Paper declaring that the EU wants to preserve the 
integrity of the Lome Convention. It is clear that the EU do not want too radical 
changes in the relations, though the EU accepts that changes are necessary. This 
quotation from ACP-EU Courier is another proof of that. Again, the need to adapt to 
international changes is underlined. This statement also demonstrates the need of 
success. 
 At the opening of the negotiations in Brussels in September 1998, the 
Commissioner for Development and ACP countries, João de Deus Pinheiro, said this 
in his speech: 
 
“The many informal discussions which have taken place in the past two years bear witness to 
an undeniable fact: we are all aware of the need for a fundamental renew of the framework of 
this partnership.” (João de Deus Pinheiro, European Commissioner for Development and ACP 
countries. Development partnership agreement with the ACP countries, opening of 
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negotiations. Opening of negotiations EU/ACP Brussels, 30 September 1998, 
http://europa.eu.int) 
This is another example of statements declaring the awareness of the need for a change 
in the partnership between the EU and the ACP states. In a speech at an EU-ACP 
Ministerial Conference (part of the negotiations) in July 1999, Pinheiro underlined the 
need of doing something with the EU-ACP partnership, due to certain problems and 
challenges, particularly poverty: 
“With official development assistance losing its legitimacy and the EU’s activity abroad 
facing up to new challenges and priorities, a revitalisation of our partnership is needed now 
more than ever. Amidst international upheaval and worsening poverty in the Southern 
hemisphere – particularly in the ACP countries – we have to tackle a major challenge: to 
combat the dynamics of exclusion, to reduce poverty and to ensure the gradual integration of 
the ACP countries into the world economy. It is against this background that you must look at 
the proposals presented by the EU.” (João de Deus Pinheiro, Member of the European 
Commission responsible for relations with the ACP countries. EU-ACP negotiations, EU-ACP 
Ministerial Conference Brussels, 29 July 1999, http://europa.eu.int) 
“The enormous challenges which some ACP states face are reason enough for preserving the 
specific qualities of the cooperation relationship, in particular its predictability and its 
contractual nature.” (European Commission, 1996: 39) 
Here the EU points to the fact that many ACP states face huge challenges, among them 
extreme poverty. This is a driving force for continuing the relationship between the EU 
and the ACP states. Another interpretation is that the EU has a strong feeling of 
responsibility towards these countries, and in that way cannot afford to reverse this 
policy. Here, the EU demonstrates not only a will, but a duty to go on with these 
special relations. This will be dealt with below. 
 
6.4.3 Preserving a culture 
“ACP-EU relations are so long-standing and pioneering that they have created an entire 
“culture” which must be safeguarded. This culture is largely based on the existence of a 
special partnership between each ACP country and the European Union. In view of the new 
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international backdrop, this partnership should be strengthened rather than weakened by 
increasing its value as a mutual political commitment.” (European Commission, 1996: 39) 
This quotation points to the fact that the relations between the EU and the ACP has 
lasted for a very long time, since the 1950s. It has in fact developed into a culture. It 
also emphasises the special partnership between them. Here, as we have seen in other 
statements above, the EU argues in favour of a continued and strengthened 
relationship with this group of states. These relations are special and should therefore 
be maintained. It not only should, but it must be preserved, according to the EU. 
 In the negotiation guidelines the EU states that it has a duty to “develop a 
responsible approach to the regions of the South, especially those most vulnerable to 
poverty and marginalisation,” because they are the most important trading partner in 
the world, the biggest aid donor, “a pole of stability” and “the most advanced example 
of regional integration” (European Commission, 1997: 8). In other words, there is not 
only a strong will to continue the relations, but also a sense of duty.                                                                                                                                                        
 In a speech at the opening of the negotiations, João de Deus Pinheiro, European 
Commissioner for Development and ACP countries said this: 
 
“I am convinced that these talks have helped us gauge the true extent of Europe’s and the ACP 
countries’ desire to continue with and improve upon the special relations between us.” (João 
de Deus Pinheiro, European Commissioner for Development and ACP countries. 
Development partnership agreement with the ACP countries, opening of negotiations. 
Opening of negotiations EU/ACP Brussels, 30 September 1998, http://europa.eu.int) 
In this statement the use of the word “desire” is notable. Pinheiro underlines the strong 
wish to not only to continue but improve the relations with the ACP countries. 
 As we have seen, many of these quotations have the same message to a great 
extent. The EU focuses largely on the need for a review and revitalisation of the 
relations with the ACP group. The EU points to challenges the ACP countries are 
facing and to international changes, both economically and politically. Further, the EU 
points to the fact that these relations have become a kind of culture which they want to 
preserve. This shows that it is difficult to reverse these relations, which have long 
roots, back to the 1950s. It demonstrates unwillingness towards radical changes to this 
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partnership, which, however, has to be reformed. These relations have taken many 
steps, and this is another step or move. This leads to the question of whether these 
relations could be characterised as a process of increasing returns, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
6.5 The EU-ACP relations – an example of an increasing returns process? 
Was it more likely that the EU decided to continue the relations with the ACP at the 
turn of a new century than previously? Was it likely that the EU would reverse these 
relations? Are these relations an example of a process of increasing returns? To 
recapitulate briefly, an increasing returns process is characterised by increasing 
probability of further steps along the same path with each move down that path. 
 The relations between the EU and the ACP countries have a long history which 
goes back to the 1950s, as we have seen in chapter 4. It began with the Treaty of Rome 
and associationism. In the 1960s the Yaoundé Conventions were signed. And finally, 
in 1975, the Lomé Convention was signed. This Convention was renegotiated several 
times, the last time in the 1990s. This development has been marked by an increasing 
number of countries participating, especially on the ACP side, as more colonies gained 
independence and a former colonial power like Great Britain joined the EU. And the 
cooperation itself has been extended. 
 This shows that the cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries has 
taken many steps along the same path. These relations are a good example of a process 
of increasing returns. The various quotations above show that there is a strong need to 
continue the relations, due to different challenges. The necessity of renewing and 
revitalising these relations is strongly underlined in the quotations above. It is rather 
unlikely that the EU would reverse the relations with the ACP countries. It has become 
a culture and there are too many challenges facing the ACP countries. 
 
6.6 Summary 
The Green Paper is a document which discusses the future of the relations with the 
ACP countries. An important question in this context is whether to maintain these 
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relations or not. There is a discussion on several alternatives of organising these 
relations and the trade between the two parties. In this discussion it becomes clear that 
preserving the integrity of the Lomé Convention is important here. Another aspect of 
the relations that is worth preserving is the partnership principle, despite its problems. 
And achieving success is quite important to the EU because the results in the past have 
been rather mixed. Quotations from the Green Paper and other sources, such as 
speeches show that there is a strong will within the EU to continue the cooperation 
with the ACP countries. The EU wants to preserve what it calls a “culture.” At the 
same time, the EU acknowledges that changes to the cooperation are necessary, due to 
changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War. The need for change 
is strongly underlined in some of the quotations.  
 Finally, I asked if these relations are an example of an increasing returns 
process. These relations have lasted for almost fifty years, with many changes through 
the years. In other words, they have taken many steps, which make it unlikely that the 
EU would reverse this process. The EU is fully aware of the challenges the ACP 
countries are facing. These challenges are one reason for preserving the relations 
between the EU and the ACP States. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 The questions asked in this thesis 
The subject for this thesis was the relations between the European Union and the ACP 
countries, which have lasted for almost 50 years. In 2000 these relations took a new 
step with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. The research question was this: What 
were the driving forces for the European Union in the process that led to the signing of 
the Cotonou Agreement?  
 There were two aspects of the term “driving forces”: Interests and path 
dependence. In the two analytical chapters I asked these questions: 
 
1. Which interests were decisive for the EU in the process which led to the 
Cotonou Agreement? 
2. Did the EU have any choice but to continue the relations with the ACP 
Countries? 
 
This thesis has been a qualitative, interpretive case study, in which I have used 
document analysis. The most important sources have mainly been documents, but also 
speeches, for instance. Most of these sources are from the European Commission. In 
this case use of quotations has been central to the analysis. 
 I will now answer the questions above. First, I will focus on EU’s interests and 
then concentrate on path dependence.  
 
7.2 EU’s interests 
In the theoretical chapter I presented and discussed three types of interests: Economic 
interests, security interests and value-based interests. These terms were the theoretical 
framework in the first part of the analysis.  
 In the analytical chapter about interests I paid quite a lot of attention to 
economic interests. These interests were certainly of great importance to the EU, most 
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likely the most important. Economic interests were important in a number of ways: 
First, the trade aspect was strongly emphasised. From the EU’s point of view there is a 
great potential in developing trade with the ACP countries. As I underlined in the 
analytical chapter, the EU clearly wants access to the ACP countries’ markets in order 
to sell their products. Non-reciprocity, which was the dominant principle in the Lome 
Convention, was abandoned in favour of reciprocity. Another important point is the 
fact that the EU is dependent on raw materials from the ACP countries. Second, it was 
important to the EU to reform parts of the technical and financial assistance. There 
was clearly reluctance to using more resources than necessary. All these factors 
demonstrate that economic interests are very important to the EU.  
 Value-based interests were also of importance to the EU in this process. 
However, it was not as important as the economic interests. But the EU has declared 
that it wants a development in the world that is compatible with European values, 
which demonstrates the importance of values. There are a number of values that the 
EU regards highly and wants to promote in the developing countries: Democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law, as well as solidarity and poverty reduction.  
 In the analytical chapter I also paid attention to security interests. Despite 
increased attention to security issues and conflict prevention in particular, and a wider 
definition of security and security threats, it has not been decisive, but it has certainly 
become more important in the Cotonou Agreement than in previous conventions. I 
also paid some attention to interests such as prestige and reputation. These have been 
important, but not decisive. 
 
7.3 The EU and path dependence 
In the analytical chapter about path dependence I asked whether the EU had any 
choice but to continue the relations with the ACP countries. However, it is not only a 
question of choice, but also a question of will to continue and necessity. There were 
several options, of which one would mean breaking up the Lomé Convention and 
signing of regional agreements, rather than having one overall agreement. The 
statements that I used in the second part of the analysis shows that the EU wanted to 
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continue the partnership with the ACP countries and preserve the integrity of the Lomé 
Convention. The EU even used the word “culture” to describe the long-lasting 
relations. These relations have a great value. The great challenges the ACP countries 
are facing were a good reason for preserving the relations. There was almost no 
discussion in the documents about the costs of reversing. The EU wanted to continue 
having relations with the ACP countries, but it focused on reforming technical and 
financial cooperation, with a better control of the use of resources and granting aid 
according to performance. 
 In other words, there was a strong will to continue the relations with the ACP 
states. Most likely, the EU had no choice but to continue the relations with the ACP 
countries, but the EU preferred a continuation of an old policy. However, changes 
were necessary. 
 
7.3.1 Are the EU-ACP relations path dependent? 
The relations between the EU and the ACP group have lasted for almost 50 years, 
since the late 1950s. It could be described as a path where the parties and the EU in 
particular, have taken many steps. With steps I mean new conventions and 
renegotiations, with changes and extensions. This means that the relations have 
developed and matured. Again, I refer to the use of the word “culture” in this context. 
The Cotonou Agreement was another step in these relations, marked by extensions. 
This agreement covers more areas than any previous conventions. The EU-ACP 
relations can be described as path dependent, as it is difficult to imagine these relations 
being reversed. 
 
7.4 The driving forces 
In the analysis I have taken a close look at two rather different aspects of the research 
question about driving forces: Interests and path dependence. The driving forces are a 
combination of several factors. On the one hand, there are the different interests that I 
have presented and discussed. Economic issues are certainly an important driving 
force. Promoting values is important too, because it gives the EU an opportunity to 
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influence the development in the ACP countries in a more democratic direction, with 
European values.  
 On the other hand, there is the path dependence. The relations between the EU 
and the ACP countries have lasted for quite a long time and have become a culture. In 
this context, reversing these relations is very difficult. The EU has demonstrated a will 
to go on for various reasons: International changes, challenges in the developing 
countries. The EU put a strong emphasis on the need for changes. 
 
 
7.5 The analytical tools – were they sufficient? 
In order to answer the questions above, I used two theoretical perspectives which are 
quite different. The first one, with its background in neo-realism, focuses on different 
types of interests: Economic interests, security interests and a rather new concept, 
value-based interests. The second theoretical perspective was path dependence, which 
is used to describe political processes. Just to repeat what it is all about; earlier events 
will affect possible outcomes of events happening in the future. And it can be very 
costly to reverse a certain policy that has been pursued for a long time.  
 Using two such different perspectives has certainly been advantageous. It made 
it possible to study several aspects of the research question about driving forces, which 
can have a pretty wide definition. I have had a close look at the EU’s various interests 
in this case and I have asked whether the EU had any choice but to continue its 
relations with the ACP group.  
 But the theoretical perspectives are not perfect and could be improved, or could 
be supplemented by other theoretical perspectives. In the theoretical chapter I 
presented three different types of interests, which should make it possible to cover 
most of the findings. Probably there should be more concepts or definitions of the term 
interests which cover more than economic issues and security issues as well as values. 
More specifically, there could be more on issues such as prestige and reputation.  
 But could we analyse the EU’s motives by using another perspective or terms? 
For instance, when starting the process, what did the EU believe it would gain? Was it 
important to gain more than the ACP countries? There are two concepts which could 
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be interesting in this context; absolute gains and relative gains. This is a debate 
between neo-realists and neo-liberals (Baldwin, 1993: 5). Neo-realists emphasise 
relative gains, which means that states are concerned with gaining more than other 
actors (ibid: 5). The neo-liberals, however, underline absolute gains; according to them 
the gains of other actors are not interesting to other states (ibid: 5). 
 It could also be interesting to study the identity of the EU. What kind of identity 
does the EU have? Has the identity of the EU changed in recent years? How does the 
EU want to be perceived by the rest of the world? Did the EU in this context make an 
attempt to change its identity? Theoretical perspectives, such as constructivism, which 
deal with issues like identity formation (Wendt, 1992: 393), could have been useful in 
this thesis. 
 The perspectives that I have used in this thesis have definitively been useful and 
have helped analysing different aspects of the research question. However, it could 
have been interesting using other perspectives as supplement to the ones that I have 
used here. But, the analysis could then be too extensive. 
 
7.6 The EU-ACP relations in the past, present and future 
The relations between the European Union and the ACP countries are still going on 
after almost fifty years of cooperation. It all began in the late 1950s with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome, which introduced the system of associationism with colonies in 
Africa, with a strong focus on trade and aid. In the 1960s the colonies gained 
independence, which made it necessary with a new agreement. In 1963 the Yaoundé 
Convention was signed and was followed by Yaoundé II in 1969. As with the Treaty 
of Rome, trade and aid were the most important elements.  
 In the early 1970s several factors such as the commodity crisis, the demand by 
developing countries of a new international economic order and Britain’s entry into the 
EC led to the need of another new agreement. Eventually, the Lomé Convention was 
signed in 1975. Trade was again very important, with the principle of abolishing 
custom duties. A new element was the STABEX system. Cooperation in industrial, 
  91 
financial and technical fields were important as well. There was also a focus on 
improving living standards in the ACP countries. 
 The Lomé Convention was renegotiated several times, with a large number of 
changes which came gradually. Important changes were the introduction of structural 
adjustment, political conditionality and a stronger focus on democracy, good 
governance and human rights.  
 In the early 1990s the EU initiated a process of reviewing its development 
policy. And in 1996 the EU Commission published the Green Paper, which is a 
discussion on the future of the relation with the ACP countries. Several options are 
presented and discussed. It leads to a public debate, which shows that there is a 
determination to go on. Negotiations are launched and the agreement is signed in June 
2000. The Cotonou Agreement is in many ways different from the previous 
conventions. Its most important objective is to promote the economic, cultural and 
social development of the ACP states and it has a quite strong political dimension. 
Much attention has also been paid to poverty eradication. Trade is again very 
important in this agreement but there are more radical changes now, as it will be 
organised in a different way, with economic partnership agreements, which is being 
negotiated. In short, the Cotonou Agreement is a much more extensive agreement than 
its predecessors. It covers a wide range of areas. 
 In accordance with Article 95 of the Cotonou Agreement it has been revised in 
2005 and the revised Cotonou Agreement was signed in Luxembourg in June 2005 by 
the EU and 76 ACP countries after negotiations that were launched in Gaborone in 
May 2004 (The EU and the ACP countries sign the revised Cotonou Agreement. 
Brussels, 24th June 2005, http://europa.eu.int). The Commissioner for Development 
and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel said this about the revised agreement: 
 
“The signature of the revised agreement is yet another important step to strengthen the 
privileged relationship between the European Union and countries in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. The global agreement represents a balanced package which improves upon the 
efficiency and quality of our partnership and reinforces our common commitment to the 
Millennium Development Goals. Poverty reduction remains at the heart of the revised 
Agreement, while the continuation of sustainable, long-term financing and inclusion of 
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important security and political dialogue provisions render our partnership even more 
effective.” (The EU and the ACP countries sign the revised Cotonou Agreement. Brussels, 24th 
June 2005, http://europa.eu.int) 
With this revision of the Cotonou Agreement, another new step has been taken in the 
relations between the EU and the ACP States, and as is said in the statement above, it 
is done in order to strengthen the partnership. The revised agreement includes a 
provision for a strengthened political dialogue, a provision on the International 
Criminal Court and mentions the fight against terrorism and the cooperation to prevent 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (The EU and the ACP countries sign the 
revised Cotonou Agreement. Brussels, 24th June 2005, http://europa.eu.int). I will not 
go into much detail here. The parties focussed on improving implementation of the 
Cotonou Agreement and on making sure it is consistent with various political 
commitments which the EU has accepted (Information note on the Revision of the 
Cotonou Agreement, http://europa.eu.int). The parties have agreed on the political 
dimension, development strategies, Investment Facility and implementation and 
management procedures (Information note on the Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, 
http://europa.eu.int). This revised Cotonou Agreement is the first revision of this 
agreement and according to Article 95 in the Cotonou Agreement it shall be revised 
every five years (The EU and the ACP countries sign the revised Cotonou Agreement. 
Brussels, 24th June 2005, http://europa.eu.int).  
 This leads to the following question: What is the future like for the Cotonou 
Agreement and the relations between the EU and the ACP countries? The most likely 
to happen is more revisions of this agreement, as with the Lome Conventions. And it 
will be interesting to see whether they will make more radical changes in later 
revisions, as with the Lome Convention. The EU seems eager to continue these 
relations, as is demonstrated in the statement above. In a few years the parties will 
have finished negotiating the economic partnership agreements, which will be 
implemented, beginning a sort of new trade regime. Whether it will be successful or 
not is another question which cannot be answered yet. But the success will depend on 
the will of both parties. It is likely that the EU will continue to help or cooperate with 
the ACP group in one way or another, due to these long traditions and its feeling of 
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responsibility towards this group of countries. Eradicating poverty, which is a very 
ambitious objective in this agreement, will be a great challenge also in the future, 
depending on the efforts made by the EU, the developing countries and other actors. 
The EU has characterised these relations as a culture which must be preserved. And it 
is a part of the EU’s image abroad. International changes will affect these relations in 
one way or another. Most likely, these relations will last as long as there is a need for 
such cooperation. 
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APPENDIX: EPA REGIONS 
Table: Regions negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements. 
West Africa 
ECOWAS13+ 
Mauritania 
Central 
Africa 
CEMAC14+ 
STP15 
Eastern & 
Southern 
Africa  
Southern 
Africa  
SADC16 
group 
Caribbean Pacific 
Benin Cameroon Burundi Angola Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Cook 
Islands 
Burkina Faso Central 
African 
Rep. 
Comoros Botswana Bahamas Fed. 
Micronesia 
Cape Verde Chad Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
Lesotho Barbados Fiji 
Gambia Congo Djibouti Mozambique Belize Kiribati 
Ghana Equatorial 
Guinea 
Eritrea Namibia Dominica Marshall 
Islands 
Guinea Gabon Ethiopia Swaziland Dominican 
Rep. 
Nauru 
Guinea 
Bissau 
São Tome 
& Principe 
Kenya Tanzania Grenada Niue 
                                            
13 ECOWAS: The Economic Community of West African States. 
14 Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale. 
15 STP: Sao Tome and Principe. 
16 SADC: The Southern African Development Community. 
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Ivory Coast  Malawi  Guyana Palau 
Liberia  Mauritius  Haiti Papua N. 
Guinea 
Mali  Madagascar  Jamaica Samoa 
Mauritania  Rwanda  St. Lucia Solomon 
Islands 
Niger  Seychelles  St. Vincent Tonga 
Nigeria  Sudan  St. Kitts & 
Nevis 
Tuvalu 
Senegal  Uganda  Surinam Vanuatu 
Sierra Leone  Zambia  Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 
Togo  Zimbabwe    
 
Source: Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. EPA: Preliminary list of country groups. Brussels, 
26 August 2004, http://www.europa.eu.int 
